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How Much is an Ambassadorship?   
And the Tale of How Watergate Led to a 
Strong Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and 
a Weak Federal Election Campaign Act 
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy* 
INTRODUCTION 
Unlike Athena who sprung fully formed from Zeus’s head, federal 
laws are generated over time by historical and political pressures.  The 
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA 74)1 and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA)2 were products of the byzantine Watergate scandal.3  
These federal statutes grew out of a dark chapter in American history when 
the Nixon Administration peddled policy outcomes to rich individuals and 
corporations willing to spend staggering sums.  FECA 74 attempted to 
 
 * Ciara Torres-Spelliscy is an Assistant Professor at Stetson University College of Law where 
she teaches Constitutional Law, Election Law, and Corporate Governance.  She would like to thank her 
Stetson research assistants Max Holzbaur, Andrew Graf, and Jordan Sager for their help investigating 
this slice of American history.  She would also like to thank Former Chief Counsel to the Church 
Committee, F.A.O. Schwarz Jr., President of Democracy 21, Fred Wertheimer, Executive Director of 
the American Judicature Society, Seth Andersen, and Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos for reading an 
earlier draft of this piece and providing invaluable comments.  Finally she would like to thank Glynn 
Torres-Spelliscy whose insights about the FCPA inspired her. 
 1 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1976)); see also LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. 
SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 14 
(1996)   (“Other   than   the  Nixon  and  Agnew  resignations,   the  most significant result of Watergate was 
campaign   finance   reform.”);;   Donald   B.   Tobin,   Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV.  611,  684  (“In  1974,  as  part  of  a  major  post-Watergate campaign reform 
effort, Congress passed the  Federal  Election  Campaign  Act  Amendments.”). 
 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (1982)); see also Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and 
Beyond: Assessing  the  SEC’s Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 529 
(2007)  (“[T]he  Foreign  Corrupt  Practices  Act  (FCPA)  takes  a  substantive-based regulatory approach to 
curb specific corporate conduct.  Congress, in the post-Watergate period when concern over corruption 
was  high,  amended  the  securities  laws  to  involve  the  SEC  in  corporate  governance.”). 
 3 Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 345, 348–59 (2000) (arguing that the Watergate scandal set in motion a chain of investigations 
that eventually led to the adoption of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); J. Lee Johnson, A Global 
Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Some Facts Worth Knowing, 63 MO. L. REV. 979, 
980 (1998)   (stating   that   “[t]he  American   disaster   known   as  Watergate   eventually   led   to   the   Foreign  
Corrupt  Practices  Act”). 
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regulate campaign finance in domestic federal elections,4 while the FCPA 
bars bribery of foreign officials (including through campaign donations).5 
The two statutes have had decidedly different fates.  FECA 74 got its 
wings clipped by the Supreme Court in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo and was 
never fully implemented as written.6  Meanwhile, the FCPA was allowed to 
flourish and remains a powerful anti-corruption tool abroad.7  Back at 
home, the U.S. has continued to struggle with how to regulate money in 
politics.  The current Supreme Court apparently tolerates only a bare 
minimum of regulation.  Reminding the Justices and ourselves why we 
have these reforms in the first place is both fitting and proper.  This is also 
a good opportunity to re-examine these issues in light of the new evidence 
in Nixon’s 1975 grand jury testimony, which was released in late 2011.8 
Voluminous tomes have already been written on the Watergate 
scandal, and I cannot, in so compressed a space, do justice to the utter 
complexity of events.  Rather, I can hone in on a few exemplars to 
elucidate broader points.  And so I will start with one of the more infamous 
quotes from Nixon’s own tapes.  When White House Counsel John Dean 
told President Richard Milhous Nixon that there was a “cancer on the 
presidency,” and that more hush money would be needed to keep the cover-
up of the Watergate break-in secret, Nixon responded without much 
hesitation that he knew where he could get a million dollars in cash.9  The 
President was used to having vast resources at his fingertips due to the 
 
 4 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1976)). 
 5 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (1982)). 
 6 Joel Gora, Don’t Feed the Alligators: Government Funding of Political Speech and the 
Unyielding Vigilance of the First Amendment, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 81,  87   (2011)   (“Almost all 
questions of the constitutional validity of campaign finance rules trace back to the fountainhead of 
Buckley v. Valeo.  Buckley involved an across-the-board challenge to the sweeping changes in federal 
campaign finance law wrought by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its post-Watergate 
amendments in 1974.”). 
 7 John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an Expanding FCPA, 26 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25,  26  (2012)  (“In  the  last  few  years,  however,  the  number  of  
FCPA prosecutions has skyrocketed and the payment of hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties or 
fines has been the routine, almost commonplace result of such investigations.”);;  Margaret  Ryznar  &  
Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States and United Kingdom: A Comparative 
Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 MO. L. REV. 415,  417  (2010)  (“By  many  measures,  2010  was  a  
banner year for FCPA investigations.  Ongoing FCPA investigations implicate numerous Fortune 500 
and other well-known  companies  .  .  .  .”). 
 8 See Adam Nagourney & Scott Shane, Newly Released Transcripts Show a Bitter and Cynical 
Nixon   in   ’75, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/us/newly-released-
transcripts-show-a-combative-richard-nixon.html?pagewanted=all. 
 9 President  Richard  M.  Nixon  Watergate  Tapes,  “Cancer  on  the  Presidency”  with  John  Dean  &  
H.R. Haldeman, HISTORY AND POLITICS OUTLOUD, Mar. 21, 1973, 10:12 AM to 11:55 AM, 
http://www.hpol.org/transcript.php?id=95  (quoting  John  Dean,  “We  have  a  cancer  within,  close  to   the  
Presidency,  that’s  growing.    It’s  growing  daily.    It’s  compounding,  it  grows  geometrically  now because 
it compounds itself. . . .  (1) [W]e’re   being   blackmailed;;   (2)   uh,   people   are   going   to   start   perjuring  
themself [sic] very quickly that have not had to perjure themselves to protect other people and the 
like.”);;  id. (quoting  President  Nixon,  “What  I  mean  is,  you  could,  you  could  get  a  million dollars.  And 
you could get it in cash.  I,  I  know  where  it  could  be  gotten.”). 
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millions of dollars flowing through his campaign committees.10  Historians 
now know that much of this money flowing through those committees 
came from illegal sources – the result of quid pro quo corruption.11 
In current policy debates over campaign finance reforms, quid pro quo 
corruption is treated as if it were as rare as a blue moon or even something 
mythical, like a mermaid or a unicorn.12  But, the facts that were revealed 
by the multiple Watergate investigations demonstrated that exchanging 
campaign contributions for public acts occurred at an alarming frequency.13 
Admittedly, catching an elected official selling public acts for 
campaign cash on the record is exceedingly rare.  Direct evidence, such as 
the federal wiretap in Democrat Rod Blagojevich’s case, which revealed an 
elected Governor (himself) discussing the sale of a public act, is 
extraordinarily hard to come by.14  Usually, tape recorders are not running 
when corruption occurs.  But as every 1L knows, in the Nixon White 
 
 10 John Aloysius Farrell, Nixon to Grand Jury: $100,000 Cash Contributions and Rewarding 
Donors with Ambassadorships, THE CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 10, 2011, 5:44 PM), 
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/11/10/7382/nixon-grand-jury-100000-cash-contributions-and-
rewarding-donors-ambassadorships (“[Nixon’s]   closest   friends   and   aides   discussed,   solicited   and  
collected secret $100,000 contributions from leaders of industry like the mysterious billionaire Howard 
Hughes,  and  Dwayne  Andreas,  the  head  of  the  giant  agribusiness,  Archer  Daniels  Midland.”). 
 11 STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 434–
35 (1990).  
 12 See Mitch McConnell, Corruption is Not an Issue in American Politics, in INSIDE THE 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW REFORMS 329 (Anthony Corrado, 
Thomas E. Mann & Trevor Potter eds., 2003)  (“During  my  eighteen  years   in   the  U.S.  Senate,   I  have  
never witnessed any colleague who changed his vote or took any official action as a result of either a 
federal  contribution  or  a  nonfederal  donation  to  a  political  party  at  the  national,  state,  or  local  levels.”);;  
Roger Pilon & John Samples, Campaign Finance, Corruption, and the Oath of Office, in CATO 
HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS 99 (Edward 
Crane & David Boaz eds., 2003), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/index.html 
(“[O]ur   legal   system   has   found   rather   less   corruption   in   politics than the reformers would have us 
believe exists. Social scientists also report scant evidence of corruption of the legislature . . . .  Thus, the 
basic premise of the campaign finance reform movement—that money corrupts and more money 
corrupts even more—comes   up   short   on   the   evidence.”);;   Susan  Chamberlain, House Hearing on the 
Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform, The Federalist Society, Free Speech & Election Law 
Practice Group Newsletter – Vol. 3, Issue 1 (Spring 1999), http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/house-hearing-on-the-constitutionality-of-campaign-finance-reform (stating 
“[t]he  House   hearing   also   highlighted   an   evidentiary   hole   in   the   case  made   by   the   those   advocating  
further   restrictions   on   political   speech.   None   of   the   ‘reform’   panelists   could   establish   that   issue  
advocacy causes quid pro quo corruption  or  even  its  appearance.”). 
 13 S. REP. NO. 93-981, at XXIV, (1974), available at http://www.maryferrell.org/ 
mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?mode=searchResult&absPageId=1477617.  [hereinafter SENATE 
SELECT REPORT]   (“The  Watergate affair reflects an alarming indifference displayed by some in high 
public office or position to concepts of morality and public responsibility and trust.  Indeed, the conduct 
of many Watergate participants seems grounded on the belief that the ends justified the means, that the 
laws  could  be  flaunted  to  maintain  the  present  [Nixon]  administration  in  office.”). 
 14 Second Superseding Indictment, U. S. v. Blagojevich, No. 08 CR 888 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/hot.html; see also Trial Exhibit 281 at 3–4, U.S. v. 
Blagojevich, No. 08 CR 888 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/hot/us_v_blagojevich/2011_05_10/ 
2008-11-05_0281_ceh2_redactions_out.pdf (Blagojevich saying on the wiretap,   “I   told   my   nephew  
Alex, . . . it’s  just  too  bad  you’re  not  four  years  older  ‘cause  I  could  a  given  you  a  U.S.  Senate  seat  for  
your  birthday  .  .  .  I  mean  I,  I’ve  got  this  thing  and  it’s  fucking  [ ] golden. . . . And  I,  I’m  just  not  giving  
it up for fucking nothing.”). 
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House tape recorders were humming along at all hours of the day.15  Like 
the Blagojevich tapes, the Nixon tapes reveal quid pro quo corruption.  
Without the Watergate investigation, the public may have never known 
about these tapes. 
The word “Watergate” itself is an instant Rorschach test.  For some, 
“Watergate” is one of DC’s most recognizable edifices.16  For others, 
“Watergate” is a synonym for the Nixon Plumbers’ DNC burglaries,17 the 
White House cover-up,18 the Senate hearings,19 or the first presidential 
resignation in U.S. history.20  When I use the word “Watergate,” as a 
campaign finance lawyer, I mean the stunning examples of quid pro quo 
corruption in the Nixon White House.  Lastly, when I state my fear that we 
are poised for a second Watergate, I mean an epic money-in-politics 
scandal.21  
Forty years after Watergate, the money-in-politics problem may be 
even worse than in Nixon’s day.  Corporations could not spend money in 
favor of Nixon (directly or indirectly) without breaking federal law.  After 
Citizens United v. FEC,22 publicly traded companies can legally purchase 
an unlimited supply of political ads and they can dump millions of dollars 
at a time into Super PACs to support (or oppose) federal candidates, 
including a sitting President.23   
 
 15 See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 331   (1974)   (“Nixon  
bugged   himself.”);; U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 683–84 (1974) (requiring Nixon to release the 
Watergate tapes); STANLEY I. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER, 637–38   (1997)   (“Butterfield   .   .   .  
acknowledged  that  ‘there  is  tape  in  the  Oval  Office.’”). 
 16 See generally Drew Lindsay, The Watergate: The Building That Changed Washington, 
WASHINGTONIAN, Oct. 1, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonian.com/ 
articles/people/1754.html (discussing the history of the Watergate building complex). 
 17 Alfred E. Lewis, 5  Held  in  Plot  to  Bug  Democrats’  Office  Here, WASH. POST, June 18, 1972, 
at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html; Richard L. Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. 
Valeo in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 351 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012) 
(“The   secret   cash   allowed   for   all   kinds   of   out-of-sight dirty tricks, such as breaking into offices of 
rivals,  planting  spies  with  opposition  campaigns,  and  attempts  at  outright  bribery  of  officials.”). 
 18 Karen De Witt, Watergate, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at A1 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/15/us/watergate-then-and-now-who-was-who-in-the-cover-up-and-
uncovering-of-watergate.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
 19 Watergate Leaks Lead to Open Hearings, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/ 
artandhistory/history/minute/Watergate_Investigation.htm (last visited April 2, 2012). 
 20 Richard M. Nixon, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
about/presidents/richardnixon (last visited April 2, 2012). 
 21 I am not alone in worrying about a second Watergate. See Bruce Freed & Karl Sandstrom, 
Dangerous Terrain: How to Manage Corporate Political Spending in a Risky New Environment, CONF. 
BOARD REV., Winter 2012, at 25, available at 
http://www.politicalaccountability.net/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/6057   (“The   very   practices   of  
Watergate—corporate cash being funneled secretly to a campaign—are  now  on  full,  legal  display.    It’s  
the players in the new political-money world that are shrouded in secrecy, and the full impact of that 
secrecy  is  not  yet  understood.”). 
 22 Citizens  United  v.  Fed.  Election  Comm’n,  130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 23 Super PACs are federal PACs that run independently of federal candidates and are permitted to 
raise unlimited money from unlimited sources, with the exception of money from a foreign person. See 
generally Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, New ‘Super PACs’ Bringing Millions into Campaigns, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/27/ 
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Part I of this essay will focus first on: (A) the pay-to-play culture in 
the Nixon White House, (B) the selling of Nixon’s ambassadorships to 
large campaign contributors, (C) the illegal corporate campaign 
contributions to the Committee for the Reelection of the President 
(CREEP), as well as (D) international corporate political expenditures.  
Next, Part II of this essay will discuss two of the post-Watergate reforms 
that responded to these problems: Congress’s expansive Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) in 197724 and the very ambitious Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1974 (also known as FECA 74).25  This piece will argue 
that the scale of these post-Watergate reforms was justified by the 
magnitude of the quid pro quo corruption in the Nixon White House.26  
This essay will close in Part III by making the case that in 2012, in this 
post-Citizens United environment, Congress should take a similar approach 
and embrace both (A) securities law reforms, as well as (B) campaign 
finance reforms, to ensure the integrity of our democratic processes.27  
 
I.  DIRTY MONEY FOR DIRTY TRICKS 
Deep Throat, who we now know was the FBI’s Mark Felt,28 told 
Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, who were 
digging into the connection between the White House and the Watergate 
burglary, to follow the money trail.29  The money that had paid for the 
 
AR2010092706500.html (describing the super PAC model and its effects on campaigns); Trevor Potter, 
Super PACs: How We Got Here, Where We Need to Go, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.clcblog.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=444:super-pacs-how-we-got-here-where-we-need-
to-go (quoting speech by Trevor Potter regarding implications of the Citizens United decision and the 
resulting Super PACs); PUBLIC CITIZEN, 12 MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENS UNITED ON 
ELECTIONS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 1 (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Citizens-United-20110113.pdf. (assessing the impact of Citizens 
United). 
 24 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (1982)). 
 25 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1976)). 
 26 See SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13,  at  XXIII  (“[This report] is also an appraisal of the 
events that led to the burglary and its sordid aftermath, an aftermath characterized by corruption, fraud, 
and  abuse  of  official  power.”). 
 27 For related works by this author see generally Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political 
Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the US Should Adopt the British Approach, RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 391 (Routledge 2011) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474421; Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate 
Campaign Spending: Giving Shareholders A Voice, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 5–6 (2010), available 
at http://brennan.3cdn.net/ 
54a676e481f019bfb8_bvm6ivakn.pdf. 
 28 David Von Drehle, FBI’s  No.  2  Was  ‘Deep  Throat’:  Mark Felt Ends 30-Year Mystery of The 
Post’s   Watergate   Source WASH. POST, June 1, 2005, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbis-no-2-was-deep-throat-mark-felt-ends-30-year-mystery-of-
the-posts-watergate-source/2012/06/04/gJQAwseRIV_story.html. 
 29 Ex-FBI Official: I’m   ‘Deep   Throat’, MSNBC.COM, June 1, 2005 8:47:37 PM ET, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8047258/ns/us_news/t/ex-fbi-official-im-deep-throat/. 
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DNC burglary came from CREEP.30  The CREEP bank accounts were flush 
with funds from large donors.31  As it turns out, the money in CREEP came 
from legitimate campaign contributions, illegitimate money from rich 
individuals seeking federal appointments, and cash from illegal and 
laundered corporate sources.32 
When prosecutors asked about the source of the million dollars from 
the “cancer on the presidency” discussion with John Dean, ex-President 
Nixon testified before a grand jury in 1975, “I was referring to funds we 
could get . . . .  And what I meant . . . is I had a number of friends who are 
very wealthy, who if they believed it was a right kind of a cause would 
have contributed a million dollars, and I think I could have gotten it within 
a matter of a week.”33  Some of those wealthy friends had donated 
extraordinarily large sums to the 1972 reelection campaign.34  Enabling the 
particularly large contributions was a gap in the federal disclosure laws 
from February to April 1972.35  This money was used for all sorts of dirty 
tricks, ranging from the sophomoric to the criminal, including the Ellsberg 
and Watergate break-ins.36   
Furthermore, Nixon had taken great pains to set up the Committee for 
the Reelection of the President (CREEP), as a committee separate from the 
Republican National Committee (RNC).  This gave him greater control 
over the campaign funds, without the normal party discipline.37  Moreover, 
 
 30 BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note 15, at 77 (“Two of President Nixon’s top campaign 
officials each withdrew more than $50,000 from a secret fund that financed the bugging of Democratic 
headquarters . . . .”); SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13,  at  1181  n.54  (“[T]he Watergate break-in 
was financed by money from the Committee to Re-Elect.”). 
 31 RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT NIXON: ALONE IN THE WHITE HOUSE 463 (First Touchstone ed., 
Simon & Schuster 2002) (donors to CREEP pre-April   7,   1972   included   “W.   Clement   Stone   of  
Combined Insurance Co., who contributed at least $2 million; Richard Mellon Scaife, $1 million; 
Arthur K. Watson of IBM, $300,000 . . . [and] Robert Vesco of International Controls Corporation, the 
target of Federal fraud investigations, $200,000 . . .”). 
 32 Hasen, supra note 17, at 351  (“Major  corporations  gave  large  sums  to  the  Nixon  campaign—
the usual request was for $100,000—despite the longstanding prohibition on corporate giving to federal 
candidates.”). 
 33 Nixon Dep. 151, June 23, 1975 (third part), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
NARA-WSPF-NIXON-GRAND-JURY-RECORDS/ 
pdf/GPO-NARA-WSPF-NIXON-GRAND-JURY-RECORDS-21.pdf [hereinafter Nixon Dep. (third 
part)]. 
 34 Id. at 135–36; Hasen, supra note 17, at 351  (“[T]he  [Nixon]  campaign’s  disclosures  revealed  
million-dollar contributions from some individuals, as well as millions of dollars in illegal contributions 
from  corporations.”). 
 35 REEVES, supra note 31, at 462  (“But  there  was  no  law.  The  Corrupt  Practices  Act  of  1972,  a  
compromise bill that passed both houses of Congress by huge margins and was signed into law by the 
President on February 7 . . . .  The new law would not take effect until April 7—sixty days after the 
President signed it . . . .  In those sixty days, the President and his committee collected more than $20 
million—almost $2 million of it in cash—with no requirement or intention to name names and 
amounts.”). 
 36 Id. at 369 (campaign funds paid for the break-in  of  Daniel  Ellsberg’s  psychiatrist);;   id. at 424 
(campaign funds paid for other dirty tricks); Mary Ferrell Foundation, Watergate, 
http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Watergate (last visited April 20, 2012) (dirty tricks included 
pranks and crimes).  
 37 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 1213 (statement   of   Senator   Weicker   (“[T]he 
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the lines between campaigning and law enforcement were blurred by the 
fact that U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell was in charge of CREEP.38  
As the Senate Select Committee Report on Watergate detailed, Attorney 
General Mitchell “held this dual role while a number of large campaign 
contributors, such as the Association of Milk Producers, the Hughes Tools 
Co., and International Telephone & Telegraph [ITT] had important 
[antitrust] cases under investigation by the Justice Department.”39 
A. The Pay-to-Play Culture in the Nixon White House 
Leon Jaworski, the Watergate Special Prosecutor who replaced 
Archibald Cox, had his work cut out for him in 1974.  Time Magazine 
summarized the scope of his investigation including “the possible ‘sale’ of 
ambassadorships to large contributors; the Administration’s settlement of 
an antitrust suit against ITT; . . . discus[sion] [of] increased dairy 
supports; . . .  the Watergate cover-up conspiracy; [and] the location of the 
tape containing an 18½ minute gap . . . .”40  In short, the Special Prosecutor 
was investigating a massive pay-to-play culture as well as an attempt at the 
highest level of the government to hide that culture from the public. 
In his 1975 grand jury testimony, former President Nixon denied 
participating in any pay-to-play exchanges as Commander in Chief—
stating specifically:  
I want to be quite categorical . . . .  That has no reference to Government 
contracts; it has no reference whatsoever to a . . . pay-off, . . . [P]eople who had 
contributed [could get] invitations, for example, to the White House dinners, . . . 
[or] possibly . . . to go to [a] funeral . . . .”41 
Thus, all that he admitted was that contributors got more access to the 
White House. 
Despite Nixon’s sanitized memory of the day-to-day workings of his 
administration, evidence strongly suggests that a pay-to-play culture had 
taken hold in his White House.42  The Administration could leverage its 
power as the law enforcement branch to extract large campaign 
contributions from people and companies facing federal liabilities.  
Instances of pay to play included dropping federal investigations and anti-
trust cases.  As Richard Reeves noted, “The contributors [to CREEP] . . . 
included several executives and companies in trouble with the Justice 
 
process that led to Watergate emasculated important party functions. It began with the decision to take 
the   party’s   leader,   and   his   reelection   out   of   the   Republican   Party   and   into   an   independent   entity,  
unresponsive to the checks and balances of party politics . . . [CREEP] was a political disaster.”)). 
 38 Id. at  1184  (“[The]  Attorney  General  .  .  .  ran  the  President’s  reelection  campaign  while  still  in  
office  at  the  Justice  Department.”).   
 39 Id. at 1205. 
 40 Watergate: Pressing Hard for the Evidence, TIME MAGAZINE (April 1, 1974) (internal 
numbering omitted). 
 41 Nixon Dep. (third part), supra note 33, at 128. 
 42 J. ANTHONY LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS 139–40 (1976). 
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Department or the Internal Revenue Service, or seeking government 
contracts.”43 
For example, executives from the oil company Amerada Hess gave 
$250,000 to CREEP.44  Hess was facing an investigation by the Interior 
Department about a refinery in the Virgin Islands.45  According to historian 
J. Anthony Lukas in his book, Nightmare, “[s]everal weeks after the large 
contribution, that investigation was dropped.”46 
In another case, the Hughes Tool Co. faced antitrust problems in a 
deal to purchase a Las Vegas hotel and an airline.47  Hughes gave $100,000 
to a friend of President Nixon.48  “At the time the money was being 
transferred, a representative of the corporation met with the Attorney 
General. [And] [t]he antitrust problems were subsequently resolved.”49 
Even before President Nixon had officially secured his party’s 
nomination in 1972, financing the Republican convention was spearheaded 
by a public corporation.50  Specifically, ITT pledged $400,000 for the 1972 
Republican National Convention. At nearly the same time, the DOJ settled 
an antitrust suit against ITT.51  President Nixon personally intervened in the 
ITT case.52  However, the only criminal prosecutions in the ITT matter 
arose out of incomplete testimony by the Attorney General Kleindienst 
before Congress.53 
The Nixon Administration also tried to tilt the executive branch into 
the service of the reelection effort.  The Watergate Senate Select 
Committee’s Final Report explained that in a Cabinet meeting in 1972, 
Fred Malek, who served in the dual capacity as Special Assistant to Nixon 
and as Deputy Chief of CREEP, communicated the White House’s “plan to 
 
 43 REEVES, supra note 31, at 463. 
 44 Id. at 140. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 1205. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 WILLIAM A. DOBROVIR ET AL., THE OFFENSES OF RICHARD M. NIXON: A GUIDE FOR THE 
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 55–59 (1973). 
 51 Id. at 55 (stating that ITT pledged $400,000 in contributions to the Republican National 
Convention  which   led   to   “the  government’s  approval   of   the   ITT-Hartford Fire Insurance merger and 
settlement  of  two  antitrust  suits  against  ITT”);;  see also U.S.  v.  Int’l  Tel.  &  Tel.  Corp.,  349  F.  Supp.  22,  
29 n.8 (D. Conn. 1972), aff’d sub nom., Nader v. U.S., 410 U.S. 919 (1973). 
 52 DOBROVIR, supra note 50, at 68 (stating  that  certain  Administration  memos  “directly  involve”  
President Nixon, and alluded that the President and Attorney General Mitchell had “agreed upon ends” 
in the resolution of the ITT case). 
 53 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13,  at  1175  (“The  [ITT]  suit  was  dropped  on  Presidential  
order,  but  when  the  Attorney  General  was  questioned  about  the  President’s  role  by  a  Senate  committee  
in March, he lied.”);;  WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT 60   (Oct.   1975)   (“Former  
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst pleaded guilty on May 16, 1974, to a charge of failing to give 
accurate testimony at his 1972 confirmation hearings, regarding White House influence on the anti-trust 
suit. . . . California Lieutenant Governor Ed Reinecke was convicted after trial on July 27, 1974, of one 
count of perjury in connection with his testimony at the same hearings . . . .  [T]here was insufficient 
evidence to allow the initiation  of  [another]  criminal  case.”). 
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make the Departments more responsive to the political needs of the 
administration.”54  The Report went on to explain: 
It was this program that led to evidence of quid pro quos for the contracts from 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, the Department of Labor, the Department of Interior, 
the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association, the General Services 
Administration, ACTION, and the Veterans’ Administration.55 
 
This all flew in the face of the Hatch Act, which bars politicizing the 
government.56  As the Senate Select Committee Report rued, “So much for 
our independent Departments and Agencies.”57 
President Nixon personally profited from pay to play. Besides funding 
the Plumbers’ various escapades for his political benefit, Nixon’s 
household also benefited from the money in his campaign coffers.58  For 
example, he purchased diamond earrings for his wife Pat for her sixtieth 
birthday using campaign funds.59  
B. Selling Ambassadorships  
Ironically, as a presidential candidate in 1968, Nixon was elected on a 
“law and order” platform.60  Today, his name is synonymous with illegality 
and scandal.61  A distasteful detail revealed in the televised Watergate 
investigations by the Senate Select Committee62 was that rich individuals 
seeking U.S. ambassadorships paid for the privilege of appointment.63  In 
 
 54 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 1210. 
 55 Id. 
 56 The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326.  
 57 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 1211. 
 58 LUKAS, supra note 42, at 366. 
 59 Id. at  367  (money  for  the  earrings  was  from  Nixon’s  1968  campaign). 
 60 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 296 (1996). 
 61 John Herbers, In Three Decades, Nixon Tasted Crisis and Defeat, Victory, Ruin and Revival, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 1994, at 30, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0109.html  (“So  strong  was  the  stigma  of   the  
Watergate scandals that it tended to obscure Mr. Nixon’s   accomplishments.”);;   see also Hunter S. 
Thompson, He Was a Crook, ROLLING STONE, June 16, 1994, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/07/he-was-a-crook/8699/  (“He  was  not  only  a  crook  
but a fool.  Two years after he quit, he told   a  TV   journalist   that   ‘if   the  president  does   it,   it   can’t  be  
illegal.’”). 
 62 The fact that the Watergate hearings were televised meant that the general public could tune in 
to witness history unfold.  Among the viewers were Supreme Court Justices. BOB WOODWARD & 
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 345 (First Simon & Schuster 
paperback ed., 2005)  (“The  damaging  news  from  the  Senate  Watergate  hearings  blared  forth  day  after  
day from a portable black-and-white television set perched on a table  in  [Justice]  Stewart’s  outer  office.  
. . .  Occasionally,  another  Justice  would  stop  by  to  savor  or  deplore  the  latest  revelation.”). 
 63 See Bruce D. La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears about “Big 
Money” and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 692 n.29 (2000) (noting that President 
Nixon received contributions of three million dollars from persons seeking ambassadorial 
appointments, and a contribution of $100,000 from an ambassador seeking a more prestigious posting); 
Do Not Delete 8/1/2012 8:27 PM 
2012] How Much is an Ambassadorship? 71 
the run up to the 1972 election, Herbert Kalmbach, President Nixon’s 
personal attorney, relayed Nixon’s fundraising instructions, one of which 
was, “[a]nybody who wants to be an ambassador must give at least 
$250,000.”64  This is a stunning amount to demand a donor to produce, 
given that $250,000 in 1972 would be equal to nearly $1.4 million in 2012 
dollars.65 
Concerning the matter of Nixon’s Ambassadors, the Senate Select 
Committee’s final report highlighted this juxtaposition: 
In a February 25, 1974, news conference, President Nixon denied that his 
administration was involved in the practice of brokering ambassadorships.  He 
declared, “Ambassadorships have not been for sale and I would not approve an 
ambassadorship unless the man or woman was qualified clearly apart from his 
contribution.”  That very day, his personal attorney and one of his principal 
fundraisers, Herbert Kalmbach, became the first person in recent times to be 




Mr. Kalmbach was convicted of promising the U.S. Ambassador to 
Trinidad, J. Fife Symington, a more prestigious European ambassadorship 
in exchange for $100,000 in campaign donations.67  Mr. Kalmbach served 
six months in jail for this behavior.68   
Apparently, Mr. Symington was not alone in giving large campaign 
donations with the expectation that an ambassadorial appointment would be 
the reward.69  The Ambassador to France, Arthur Watson, gave $300,000 to 
CREEP, and the Ambassador to Britain, Walter Annenberg, gave 
$250,000, before their respective appointments.70 
The Luxembourg ambassadorship was purchased by Dr. Ruth B. 
Farkas.71  Originally, she considered being the Ambassador of Costa Rica 
in 1971.72  The price for the post Mr. Kalmbach suggested was $250,000.73  
Dr. Farkas’s response to this price was, “Well, you know, I am interested in 
Europe, I think, and isn’t two hundred and fifty thousand dollars an awful 
 
Farrell, supra note 10 (noting   that   President   Nixon   followed   the   “traditional   American   practice”   of  
naming rich donors to luxury ambassadorships such as Luxembourg and El Salvador). 
 64 REEVES, supra note 31, at 462. 
 65 CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited April 2, 2012). 
 66 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 492. 
 67 Id. at 492–93. 
 68 LUKAS, supra note 42, at 135; KUTLER, supra note 11, at 575   (“Herbert  Kalmbach  pleaded  
guilty in February 1974 to several campaign violations, and in return for his testimony, all other charges 
were  dropped.”). 
 69 See Senate Select Report, supra note 13, at 494. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Lawrence Van Gelder, Ruth   Farkas,   89,   Nixon’s   Ambassador   to   Luxembourg,   Dies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/22/nyregion/ruth-farkas-89-nixon-
s-ambassador-to-luxembourg-dies.html?src=pm (quoting  Senator  Gale  W.  McGee  of  Wyoming,   “The  
money—that’s  par  for  the  course.    It  used  to  be  a  cheaper  price—but  that’s  Nixon  inflation.”). 
 72 LUKAS, supra note 42, at 136–37. 
 73 Id. at 137. 
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lot of money for Costa Rica?”74  Later the Farkas family was offered the 
Luxembourg post for $300,000 to which Mr. Farkas, Ruth’s husband, 
reportedly replied, “Done!”75  In August of 1972, the White House sent a 
letter of intent to the Senate indicating Dr. Farkas was up for the 
Luxembourg post, pending FBI clearance.76  In September of 1972 she 
started making payments.77  Six days after her final installment of the 
$300,000 payment, her nomination was delivered to the Senate in February 
1973.78 
The recently released grand jury testimony of former President Nixon 
does not clarify exactly what happened with his ambassadorial 
appointments.  In his testimony, although he pointed fingers at the bad 
motives of Democratic presidents,79 Nixon flatly denied under oath that he 
ever sold an ambassadorship.80  While he expressed his disdain for career 
ambassadors,81 he did admit he gave “top consideration to major financial 
contributors mainly for the reason that big contributors in many instances 
make better ambassadors, particularly where American economic interests 
are involved.”82  Prosecutors asked Nixon about five specific donors and 
their ambassadorial ambitions.  In response, Nixon related in his testimony 
that, “[t]he only awareness that I have had with regard to Mr. [Kingdon] 
Gould or any of the five83 that you mentioned or any ambassadors at all is 
the understanding that if a contribution be made that they would be given 
consideration for a post, but that no absolute commitment could be 
made.”84 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id.; see also SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 494 (quoting Senator Pell, “Benelux  
seems to be the most expensive place on which to be appointed because Mrs. Farkas, who is 
ambassador   to   Luxembourg,   and   she   wasn’t   appointed   until   her   contribution   had   been   put   to   the  
barrelhead even though an agreement had been received 6 or 8 months earlier, contributed $300,000 . . . 
.”). 




pdf/GPO-NARA-WSPF-NIXON-GRAND-JURY-RECORDS-19.pdf   (Nixon   testifying,   “Bill   Bullitt,  
for   example,  was  probably   the  best  ambassador   to  Russia   .   .   .  Now  he  didn’t   get  his   job  because  he  
happened to shave the top of his head.  He got his job because he contributed a half million dollars to 
Mr.  [Franklin]  Roosevelt’s  campaign.  .  .  .  Pearl  Mesta  wasn’t  sent  to  Luxembourg  because she had big 
bosoms.      Pearl   Mesta   went   to   Luxembourg   because   she   made   a   good   contribution   [to   Truman].”) 
[hereinafter Nixon Dep. (first part)]. 
 80 Id. at  27  (“I  can’t  believe that I would have ever have made any commitment to him or anyone 
else  to  be  an  ambassador  for  a  financial  contribution.”). 
 81 Id. at  25   (“As   far   as   career   ambassadors,  most   of   them  are   a  bunch  of   eunuchs,   and   I   don’t  
mean  that  in  a  physical  sense,  but  I  meant  it  in  an  emotional  sense,  in  a  mental  sense.”). 
 82 Id. at 35. 
 83 Five here refers to the following five individuals Ruth Farkas, J. Fife Symington, Jr., Vincent 
deRoulet, Cornelius V. Whitney and Kingdon Gould, Jr. Id. at 6. 
 84 Id. at 53. 
Do Not Delete 8/1/2012 8:27 PM 
2012] How Much is an Ambassadorship? 73 
The closest Nixon comes to admitting any impropriety in his grand 
jury testimony was the following statement in which he explained why 
certain large contributions were returned to contributors when an 
ambassadorship was not granted:  
[If] financial contributors . . . felt they had a commitment and we couldn’t keep 
it, [we’d] return their money . . . [S]ome over-zealous person may have used the 
word “commitment,” may have even used the words, “we’ve got the deal 
made” . . . and [if] we were unable to make an appointment . . . I felt the only 
honorable thing to do was to return the contribution . . . .85 
Here, Nixon comes perilously close to saying that if the White House could 
not produce the desired quo, then they gave back the donor’s quid. 
The Senate Select Committee investigating Watergate said of the 
Nixon ambassadorships: “[O]ver $1.8 million in Presidential campaign 
contributions can be attributed in whole, or in part, to persons holding 
ambassadorial appointments . . . [And] [s]ix large contributors, who gave 
an aggregate of over $3 million, appear to have been actively seeking such 
appointments at the time of their contributions.”86  The Watergate Special 
Prosecutor did not prosecute any of the Nixon Ambassadors, citing an 
inability to prove a prior quid pro quo arrangement.87   
The matter of selling ambassadorships was brought up at oral 
argument before the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, by Deputy 
Solicitor General Daniel M. Friedman:  
There’s no need to go into any detail with that sorry and sordid story [of the 1972 
election] . . . . It’s a matter of public knowledge.  The huge campaign 
contributions.  The gifts from people who wanted to be ambassadors.  The 
campaign specific large contributions [done] with anticipation of government 
actions, such as the milk producers.  The large number of corporate officials who 
were convicted and many of whom pleaded guilty to illegal campaign 
contributions.88 
Even though Mr. Friedman spoke to the Supreme Court Justices as if 
all of them in the room were painfully aware of the corruption of the Nixon 
White House, by the time that the actual Buckley Supreme Court opinion 
was written, the selling of ambassadorships and the illegal corporate 
campaign contributions were nowhere to be found in the text of the 
 
 85 Id. at 46. 
 86 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 494. 
 87 WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT, supra note 53,   at   78   (“Although  
contributors of large campaign sums obviously received Administration responses to their desires to 
serve as ambassadors, a crime is not proved unless the prosecution can show a prior quid pro quo 
arrangement, i.e., a prior commitment of support for the position in exchange for a forthcoming 
contribution. Such proof is available only if one of the participants in such a conversation admits the 
express commitment.  However, each official and fundraiser involved denied having made promises of 
appointments  and  WSPF  was  unable  to  prove  the  contrary.”). 
 88 Oral Argument of Daniel Friedman at 56:29–57:09, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (No. 75-
436), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_75_436. 
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decision.89  This silence in the Buckley Supreme Court decision has left a 
knowledge gap for lawyers and lay persons alike who did not experience 
Watergate firsthand.  All the Buckley Supreme Court opinion explained is 
that something sinister happened in the 1972 election without elaboration: 
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo 
from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of 
representative democracy is undermined.  Although the scope of such pernicious 
practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples 
surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory 
one.90 
Thus, Buckley, the seminal post-Watergate case, inexplicably omits these 
key facts of quid pro quo corruption.91 
C. Illegal Corporate Contributions to CREEP 
On top of selling ambassadorships, which was illegal under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 600,92 another type of fundraising in the Nixon reelection campaign was 
equally illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 610.93  Corporations at the time of the 
1972 election could not give a direct contribution to federal candidates for 
office because of a very old federal ban called the Tillman Act of 1907.94  
This ban is still in effect, even after Citizens United,95 in light of a 2003 
Supreme Court case called Beaumont.96 
 
 89 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 90 Id. at 26–27. 
 91 Id. at 27 (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the 
impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse 
inherent  in  a  regime  of  large  individual  financial  contributions.”). 
 92 18 U.S.C. § 600 (1970)  (“Whoever,  directly or indirectly, promises any employment, position, 
work, compensation, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in whole or in part by any Act of 
Congress, to any person as consideration, favor, or reward for any political activity or for the support of 
or opposition to any candidate or any political party in any election, shall be fined not more than $1,000 
or  imprisoned  not  more  than  one  year,  or  both.”). 
 93 18 U.S.C. § 610  (1970)  (“It  is  unlawful  for  any  national  bank,  or  any  corporation  organized by 
authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election 
to any political office . . . .”). 
 94 The Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 36, 420 Stat. 864 (1907); see United States v. U.S. Brewers 
Ass’n,   239   F.   163, 168 (W.D. Pa. 1916)   (upholding   the   Tillman  Act   and   finding,   “[t]hese   artificial  
creatures [e.g. corporations] are not citizens of the United States, and so far as the franchise is 
concerned, must at all times be held subservient and subordinate to the government and the citizenship 
of which it is composed”). 
 95 There is one lower court case post-Citizens United which held that the Tillman Act could not 
be used in that particular case. U.S. v. Danielczyk, 791 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding 
the federal   Tillman   Act’s   ban   on   corporate   donations   unconstitutional   as   applied   to   a   specific  
corporation).  The Danielczyk case is currently on appeal. 
 96 Fed. Election Comm’n   v.   Beaumont,   539   U.S.   146,   154   (2003)   (explaining   “the   [corporate  
contribution] ban  has  always  done  further  duty  in  protecting  ‘the  individuals  who  have  paid  money  into  
a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to 
support political candidates   to  whom   they  may  be  opposed.’”)   (internal citations omitted); id. at 163 
(“The  PAC  option  allows  corporate  political  participation  without  the  temptation to use corporate funds 
for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and 
it lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure . . . .”). 
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So then, as now, corporations were (and are) legally banned from 
giving corporate treasury funds to a federal candidate, including a sitting 
President seeking funds for his reelection.  But this did not stop those in 
charge of CREEP from seeking illegal corporate contributions.  The reason 
corporate officers gave corporate money to the President’s reelection 
campaign was to “avoid possible retaliation by the Nixon administration.”97  
According to some of the corporate executives who testified before the 
Senate Select Committee investigating Watergate, the fundraising by 
CREEP was the equivalent of a shake down by a mobster—pay up or 
else.98  Since many of the companies in question had matters pending 
before federal regulators, they paid when asked.  As George Spater99 of 
American Airlines testified: 
There were two aspects: would you get something if you gave it, or would you be 
prevented from getting something if you didn’t give it? . . .  Most contributions 
from the business community are not volunteered to seek a competitive 
advantage but are made in response to pressure, for fear of the competitive 
disadvantage that might result if they are not made . . . .100 
And so pay American Airlines did, first monetarily,101 and then with a 
misdemeanor criminal conviction.102 
Gulf Oil’s Vice President of Governmental Relations, Claude Wild, 
said he decided to arrange a $50,000 contribution from Gulf Oil’s general 
treasury funds to CREEP so that his company would not be on a “blacklist” 
or at the “bottom of the totem pole” when it came time for someone in 
Washington to return his phone calls.103  Another corporate executive, the 
Chairman of Ashland Oil Co., Orin Atkins, viewed the corporate 
contributions to CREEP as a necessary “calling card, something that would 
get us in the door and make our point of view heard.”104 
Whatever the reasons executives gave post hoc for the political 
contributions, the fact remained that it was illegal for corporations to 
contribute, thus giving to CREEP opened the payers and the payees to 
 
 97 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, & POLITICAL REFORM 
19 (4th ed. 1992) (“Officials of the corporations that donated [pre-Watergate] claimed they did so not to 
obtain favors, but to avoid possible retaliation  by  the  Nixon  administration.”).   
 98 See e.g., Jill Abramson, Return of the Secret Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at K1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/weekinreview/ 
17abramson.html?pagewanted=all (“The Committee for the Re-Election of the President was also 
illegally hauling in many millions of dollars from corporations, many of which felt pressured into 
making contributions.”). 
 99 N.O.B.C. Reports on the Results of Watergate Related Charges Against Twenty-nine Lawyers, 
62 A.B.A. J. 1337, 1337 (1976) (noting Spater was publicly admonished by the First Department of 
New York).  
 100 LUKAS, supra note 42, at 128–29 (quoting Spater). 
 101 Id. at 129 (“These  terrors  proved  compelling  and  American  [Airlines]  paid  its  tithe.”). 
 102 Joseph Berger, George A. Spater Dies at 75; Author and Airline Executive, Obituary, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 1984, at D19. 
 103 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 470. 
 104 Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972 Senate Resolution 60: Hearings before the Senate 
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong. 5442 (1973) (quoting Orin Atkins). 
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liability.105  The risk of this illegality was borne by shareholders in the 
publicly traded companies involved, who were unwittingly underwriting 
this behavior.106  As Michael Holt argued in a piece written in the 
immediate aftermath of Watergate, “[f]or corporate shareholders, one of the 
most disturbing findings was the large number of illegal corporate 
campaign contributions.”107 
1. The Milk Man Always Rings Twice 
The clearest example of quid pro quo corruption in the Nixon White 
House involved the dairy industry.  The Associated Milk Producers 
Incorporated (AMPI) sought increased federal price supports in exchange 
for a pledge of $2 million in contributions to CREEP.108  The D.C. Circuit 
Court once noted: “[t]he record before Congress was replete with specific 
examples of improper attempts to obtain governmental favor in return for 
large campaign contributions.”109  The D.C. Circuit Court also noted the 
subterfuge of the milk producers’ splitting up the $2 million into many 
smaller contributions to avoid discovery:110 
Since the milk producers, on legal advice, worked on a $2,500 limit per 
committee, they evolved a procedure, after consultation . . . with Nixon fund 
raisers, to break down the $2 million into numerous smaller contributions to 
hundreds of committees in various states which could then hold the money for 
the President’s reelection campaign, so as to permit the producers to meet 
independent reporting requirements without disclosure.111 
The $2,500 contribution level was picked not only to avoid disclosure, but 
also to avoid triggering the IRS gift tax, which kicked in at $3,000 at the 
time.112 
The obfuscation nearly worked.  As the Senate Select Committee’s 
Report detailed, “the milk producers could report the contributions [to the 
100 intermediate] . . . committees, without the ultimate beneficiary, the 
 
 105 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). 
 106 See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 118   (2010)   (“The  
hierarchical structure of corporations made it possible for a handful of decision makers to deploy those 
resources and combine them with the massive but underutilized capacities of their far-flung 
organizations.  These were the preconditions for an organizational revolution that was to remake 
Washington in less than a decade—and, in the process, lay the critical groundwork for winner-take-all 
politics.”). 
 107 Michael D. Holt, Corporate Democracy and the Corporate Political Contribution, 61 IOWA L. 
REV. 545, 545 (1975). 
 108 REEVES, supra note 31, at 308–09   (“[T]he President personally traded higher federal milk 
production subsidies for more than $2 million  in  secret  campaign  funds  for  1972.”). 
 109 Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 110 Id. at 839 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Looming   large   in   the   perception   of   the   public   and  
Congressmen was the revelation concerning the extensive contributions by dairy organizations to Nixon 
fund  raisers,  in  order  to  gain  a  meeting  with  White  House  officials  on  price  supports.”). 
 111 Id. (internal citations to the SENATE SELECT REPORT omitted). 
 112 LUKAS, supra note 42,  at  125  (“Each [AMPI] committee was to receive only $2,500, to take 
advantage of an IRS rule eliminating the gift tax for contributions  under  $3,000.”). 
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President’s campaign, being disclosed.113  And, moreover, the names of the 
committees were meant to be innocuous, such as the one ironically named, 
“Americans United for Honesty in Government.”114 
The Agriculture Department was not prepared to accede to the 
dairy industry’s request for increased federal price supports, but President 
Nixon reversed the Department’s decision.115  President Nixon’s personal 
intervention in the milk price supports was explained by one court in the 
following manner: 
On March 23, 1971, after a meeting with dairy organization representatives, 
President Nixon decided to overrule the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture 
and to increase price supports.  In . . . a meeting held by Herbert Kalmbach at the 
direction of John Ehrlichman, the dairymen were informed of the likelihood of 
an imminent increase and of the desire that they reaffirm their $2 million 
pledge.116 
Reporter Richard Reeves suggested that in the deal with the dairy industry, 
“Nixon got $2 million for charging American consumers $100 million.”117 
Nixon’s taping system picked up details of the dairy deal.  John 
Ehrlichman, the President’s Counsel, is heard to say on the tapes, “better go 
get ourselves a glass of milk.  Drink it while it’s still cheap.”118  Then, 
laughter is heard on the tape.119  Nixon himself was informed of the deal by 
Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President.120  The head of AMPI 
and one of its lobbyists eventually went to prison for this conduct.121 
The exchange of campaign money for milk price supports shows that 
contributions were given for specific governmental actions. One dairyman 
who participated in the deal described the reality of quid pro quo corruption 
from an insider’s perspective: 
If dairymen are to receive their fair share of the governmental financial pie that 
we all pay for, we must have friends in Government.  I have become increasingly 
aware that the sincere and soft voice of the dairy farmer is no match for the jingle 
 
 113 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 615.   
 114 Id. at 693.  
 115 Id. at   1209   (“[I]t is important to note that the legitimate functions of the Agriculture 
Department  were  circumvented  and  interfered  with.”).     
 116 Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.36 (internal citations to the Senate Select Committee’s  Final  Report  
omitted). 
 117 Peter Overby, Illegal During Watergate, Unlimited Campaign Donations Now Fair Game, 
NPR: IT’S ALL POLITICS (Nov. 16, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2011/11/16/142314581/illegal-during-watergate-unlimited-
campaign-contributions-now-fair-game (quoting Richard Reeves); REEVES, supra note 31, at 309 
(“Nixon  asked  how  much   the   raising  of   the   [milk]   support   price  would   cost   the  government.   ‘About  
$100  million,’  [Secretary  of  Agriculture  Clifford]  Hardin  answered.”). 
 118 LUKAS, supra note 42, at 121 (quoting Ehrlichman). 
 119 Id. 
 120 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 612–14, 616. 
 121 Overby, supra note 117 (referencing jail); see also D. Bruce La Pierre, Campaign Contribution 
Limits: Pandering to Public Fears about ‘Big Money’ and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
687, 692 n.29 (2000) (noting a contribution of two million dollars from the dairy industry to President 
Nixon’s  re-election campaign). 
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of hard currencies put in the campaign funds of politicians . . . We dairymen 
cannot afford to overlook this kind of economic benefit.  Whether we like it or 
not, this is the way the system works.122 
As it turns out, money from the dairymen paid for part of the Ellsberg 
break-in.123  The dirty money paid for dirty tricks. 
The Watergate Special Prosecutor’s office investigated President 
Nixon on ten separate matters, including the milk price supports.124  
Because Nixon was pardoned by President Ford, the American public never 
learned the full extent of his Administration’s illegal activities.125 
2. But Wait, There’s More 
What corporate donors to CREEP (other than AMPI) were  getting in 
return for their campaign money was less clear, other than vague 
assurances from the White House to be helpful in pending federal 
matters.126 
As Senator Ervin stated in the Watergate Senate Select Committee 
Report: 
[T]hey [the President’s men] exacted enormous contributions—usually in cash—
from corporate executives by impliedly implanting in their minds the impression 
that the making of the contributions was necessary to insure that the corporations 
would receive governmental favors, or avoid governmental disfavors, while 
President Nixon remained in the White House.  A substantial portion of the 
contributions were made out of corporate funds in violations of a law enacted by 
Congress a generation ago.127 
An exemplar of these larger trends was American Airlines which “was 
susceptible to [ ] pressure [for corporate contributions] because the 
company had at least twenty important matters pending before various 
federal agencies, among them a proposed merger between American and 
Western airlines.”128  
American Airlines was not exceptional in giving to CREEP.  All told, 
twenty-one companies pleaded guilty to charges alleged by Watergate 
special prosecutor Archibald Cox of making illegal corporate contributions 
 
 122 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 671 (quoting a letter from dairyman William 
Powell, President of Mid-Am). 
 123 Id. at 688. 
 124 Michael K. McKibbin, On Executive Clemency: The Pardon of Richard M. Nixon, 2 PEPP. L. 
REV. 353, 376 n.90 (1975). 
 125 James M. Naughton & Adam Clymer, Gerald Ford Dies; Nixon’s Successor in ’74 Crisis was 
93, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006, at A1. 
 126 LUKAS, supra note 42,   at   126   (“[A]irlines, oil companies, and defense industries [ ] looked 
with hope and apprehension to Washington.  There have been rumors that Nixon campaign officials 
drew up a list of corporations that had particular  ‘problems  with  the  government,’  but  investigators  have  
been  unable  to  find  it.”). 
 127 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 1098 (Statement of Senator Ervin). 
 128 LUKAS, supra note 42, at 128. 
Do Not Delete 8/1/2012 8:27 PM 
2012] How Much is an Ambassadorship? 79 
totaling $968,000.129  Among the list of companies that ran afoul of the 
corporate campaign finance laws in Nixon’s reelection campaign were 
several marquee names, many of which are still around today.130  As 
Former FEC Chair Trevor Potter stated in a speech last year: 
It is usually forgotten now how many major corporations were found to have 
violated the law: ITT, American Airlines, Braniff, Ashland Oil, Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber, Gulf, Philips, Greyhound—those were just a few of the well-known 
corporations caught up in the Watergate campaign financing scandal: 31 
executives ended up being charged with criminal campaign violations, and many 
plead guilty.131 
Other companies ensnared in the Watergate corporate contribution 
scandal included Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. (more 
commonly known as “3M”), Carnation Co., American Ship Building Co., 
Diamond International Corp., The Hertz Corp., Lehigh Valley Cooperative 
Farmers, Inc., and Northrop Corp.132  As this list shows, they were not fly 
by night operations; rather, they were blue chip American companies 
breaking the law.  Northrop faced additional liability because it was a 
government contractor at the time the corporation donated, which was 
barred under the Hatch Act.133 
Another aspect to consider is that this illegal corporate money was not 
given to CREEP by some rogue employee.  The source was typically either 
from a corporation’s in-house governmental relations shop, or in some 
cases, the head of the company.134  For example, the Watergate Special 
Prosecution Force Report, noted that “[d]uring the months following 
President Nixon’s resignation . . . George Steinbrenner [who was the 
Chairman] and the American Ship Building Company pleaded guilty to 
charges of conspiracy and making an illegal campaign contribution [to 
CREEP] . . . .”135  Indeed, American Ship Building engaged in an elaborate 
ruse where executives were given bogus bonuses and then they gave the 
 
 129 ALEXANDER, supra note 97, at 18. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Trevor Potter’s Keynote   Address   at  Conference   Board’s   Symposium   on  Corporate Political 
Spending, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. BLOG (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.clcblog.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=437%3Atrevor-potters-
keynote-address-at-conference-boards-symposium-on-corporate-political-spending-10-21-11 (quoting 
Trevor Potter’s keynote address). 
 132 See SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 507–10 (listing contributions solicited by 
Herbert Kalmbach); id. at 446–92 (detailing illegal corporate contributions from thirteen companies); 
KUTLER, supra note 11, at 435 (listing corporations as breaking the campaign finance laws during 
Nixon’s   administration   including,   among   others, 3M, Carnation Company and the American Ship 
Building Company). 
 133 WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 159. Northrop 
Corporation entered a guilty plea to violation of 18 U.S.C. § 611, illegal campaign contributions by a 
government contractor. Id. 
 134 See KUTLER, supra note 11,  at  435;;  Trevor  Potter’s  Keynote  Address,  supra note 131. 
 135 WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 19. 
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excess money to political candidates to disguise the corporate source of the 
money.136 
Another jarring dimension of the corporate donations to CREEP is the 
dollar figures involved.  According to the Senate Select Committee’s final 
report, Goodyear gave $40,000,137 Ashland Oil gave $100,000,138 Gulf Oil 
gave $100,000,139 Philips Petroleum gave $100,000,140 and Northrop gave 
$150,000.141  And recall, these figures are all in 1972 dollars.  If this last 
figure is translated into 2012 dollars, $150,000 in 1972 would roughly 
equal $800,000 today.142 
Moreover, because the corporate campaign contributions were illegal, 
the companies paying them to CREEP often had to launder the money 
through a foreign subsidiary or a foreign bank in order to make the 
payment.143  Payments were often made in cash and in person since neither 
side wanted the paper trail that accompanies a check.144  These details came 
to light in Senate testimony by Claude Wild, Vice President of Government 
Affairs of Gulf Oil.145  
Mr. Wild gave a grand total of $100,000146 and pleaded guilty of 
violating the federal election laws147 for his donation of corporate funds to 
 
 136 REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL 
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN 
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 36 (May 12, 1976), available at 
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1970/1976_0512_SECQuestionab
le.pdfhttp://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1970/1976_0512_SECQuest
ionable.pdf [hereinafter SEC REPORT ON ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS]   (“[S]elected employees 
were paid bonuses of $30,000 in 1970, $25,000 in 1971 and $42,325 in 1972. After receiving these 
bonuses . . . the selected employees would be directed to contribute the remainder to various political 
figures.”). 
 137 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 465. 
 138 Id. at 459. 
 139 Id. at 469. 
 140 Id. at 489. 
 141 Id. at 486. 
 142 CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 65 (to translate 1972 dollars in 2012 dollars multiply by 
roughly 5.3). 
 143 See BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note 15, at 52–54 (discussing money from Gulf 
Resources and Chemical Co. to CREEP that had moved through Mexico); id. at 54 (quoting Miami 
investigator  Martin  Dardis,   “It’s   called   ‘laundering’   .   .   .   .  You set up a money chain that makes it 
impossible  to  trace  the  source.”). 
 144 Profile: Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), HISTORY COMMONS, 
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=committee_to_re_elect_the_president_1 (last visited 
April  7,  2012)  (discussing  how  President  Nixon’s  finance director, the financial chief of CREEP, used a 
Mexican money laundering system to collect illegal donations from corporations). 
 145 For example, Sam Dash, Chief Counsel, Watergate Committee asked Claude Wild, V.P. 
Government Affairs of Gulf Oil: “Did  you  make   a   contribution   to   the  president’s   reelection   effort?”  
Claude Wild replied: “Well, I did.  I called the controller of one of our companies in the Bahamas and 
told him I needed $50,000, and he brought it to me.”  Sam Dash asked: “In what form was the 
$50,000?”  Mr. Wild said: “It was in cash.”  Black Money: Transcript, FRONTLINE (April 7, 2009), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
blackmoney/etc/script.html; SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 469 (quoting Mr. Wild and Mr. 
Dash). 
 146 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 469–70. 
 147 Wyndham Robertson, The Directors Woke Up Too Late at Gulf, FORTUNE, June 1976, at 121 
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CREEP.148  Later investigations revealed that the $100,000 was only the tip 
of the iceberg, and that $5.4 million returned to Gulf Oil from foreign 
countries in off-book transactions.149  This money was used for political 
contributions, gifts, and related expenses.150 
However, Gulf Oil was not alone in laundering political donations.151  
American Airlines paid $100,000, which was drawn from a New York 
bank, routed through a Swiss account of a Lebanese agent, and then 
transferred back to a different New York bank.152 Meanwhile, Braniff 
Airlines gave CREEP a $40,000 donation by billing a Panamanian 
company, owned by a Braniff manager, for “expenses and services,” and 
forwarding cash from the transaction from Panama to Dallas, then on to an 
agent of CREEP.153  The 3M Company misappropriated corporate funds for 
secret domestic political contributions.  “The assets of the [3M] secret fund 
were generated through fictitious foreign insurance premiums . . . and 
through kickbacks by a foreign legal consultant.”154  Even on the so-called 
“smoking gun” tape, which proves that Nixon was part of the Watergate 
cover-up, White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman informed President 
Nixon of money for the DNC burglary being traced through a Mexican 
bank.155 
Given the sensitive nature of information regarding the illegal sources 
of campaign funds, the record of donors to CREEP was a closely held 
secret.  The donor list was kept in a locked drawer by Rose Mary Woods, 
Nixon’s personal secretary.156  The list, known as “Rose Mary’s Baby,” did 
 
(surmising that Gulf’s directors delayed an internal investigation  into  Claude  Wild’s  illegally  authorized  
payments  to  President  Nixon’s  reelection  campaign  until  the  SEC  increased  pressure  on  the  company);;  
WATERGATE: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 212, 213 (Stanley Kutler ed., 2d ed. 2009) (noting 
that Claude Wild received a $1,000 fine on November 13, 1973 after pleading guilty to making illegal 
campaign   contributions   to   President   Nixon’s   reelection   campaign); FRONTLINE, supra note 145 
(reporting Claude Wild’s campaign contributions for CREEP and his utilizing offshore banks to 
facilitate  a  $50,000  payment  to  President  Nixon’s  campaign). 
 148 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13,  at  473  (“Gulf  Oil  Co.  and  Wild  were  fined  $5,000  and  
$1,000, respectively, for making illegal corporate contributions to the Presidential campaign of 
President   Nixon.”);;   Shlensky   v.   Dorsey,   574   F.2d   131,   135   (3d   Cir.   1978)   (noting   that   Mr.   Wild  
donated  $100,000  of  Gulf  Oil’s  funds  to  President  Nixon’s  reelection  campaign,  and  subsequently  pled  
guilty to criminal charges of violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act). 
 149 SEC REPORT ON ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS, supra note 136, at 37.  
 150 Id. 
 151 LUKAS, supra note 42,   at   130   (“Northrop,   Goodyear,   and   Ashland   Oil   also   laundered   their  
contributions  through  foreign  subsidiaries  or  agents.”);;  see also HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING 
THE 1972 ELECTION 514 (1976) (discussing the laundering of contributions from American Airlines). 
 152 LUKAS, supra note 42, at 129. 
 153 Id. 
 154  SEC REPORT ON ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS, supra note 136, at 38. 
 155 Multisuperhands, Nixon: Raw Watergate Tape: ‘Smoking Gun’ Section, YOUTUBE (Apr. 4, 
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oe3OgU8W0s (broadcasting a June 23, 1972 audio 
recording of Richard Nixon and Bob Haldeman conversing in the Oval Office where Nixon said, “He 
didn’t  [get  the  money]  from  [CREEP]  though;;  this  is  from  Stans,” to which Haldeman replied, “Yeah.  
It is. . . .  It’s  directly  traceable  and  there’s  some  more  through some Texas people . . . that went to the 
Mexican  bank  which  they  can  also  trace  to  the  Mexican  bank.  They’ll  get  their  names  today.”). 
 156 Abramson, supra note 98. 
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not become public until it came to light in the course of a lawsuit by the 
good government watchdog Common Cause.157 
D. The International Corporate Slush Funds 
Of course, it takes two to tango.  The quid pro quo corruption in the 
Nixon White House would not have been possible without individuals and 
corporations who were willing to pay.  The Nixon Administration did not 
have a monopoly on venality.  There were plenty of corporations in 
particular who seemed eager to either bend or break the rules. 
The more investigations prosecutors, Congress, and the SEC 
performed, the deeper the rabbit hole of corporate donations went.158  
Corporate donations flowed not just to Nixon’s campaign, but also to 
Democratic candidates as well.159  In Nixon’s grand jury testimony, he 
pointed fingers at the Democrats.160  For example, Nixon said to 
prosecutors, “I trust . . . that you are pursuing with the same tenacity . . . the 
over 150 charges of campaign violations that are in your files with regard 
to Democratic candidates and with regard to the McGovern 
campaign . . . .”161  Nixon, however, did not admit he or his associates 
solicited any illegal contributions.  He testified, “[B]ecause of the 
presidential pardon . . . I can admit anything with impunity, but you are not 
going to use me to try to nail somebody else . . . .  I am not going to be 
loose with my tongue and try to cooperate with you in a vendetta . . . .”162 
Nixon was correct about one thing: the problem of money in politics 
was a bipartisan one, and corporate donors were playing both sides of the 
fence.  As J. Anthony Lukas reports:  
Several companies that made corporate contributions in 1972 have now conceded 
that their gifts came from large political “slush funds” which in some cases had 
been in existence for more than a decade.  The largest discovered so far—$10.3 
million—belonged to Gulf Oil, which acknowledged that it used the money for 
political contributions and  “related activities” here and abroad between 1960 and 
1974 . . . .  [3M] conceded that between 1963 and 1972 it doled out at least 
$634,000 in 390 contributions to politicians of both parties.  Northrop spent 
$476,000 since 1961, Phillips Petroleum spent some $585,000 in ten years, and 
Ashland Oil $801,165 in eight years—both excluding their 1972 contributions to 
Nixon.163 
 
 157 Id.; see also CONRAD BLACK, RICHARD M. NIXON: A LIFE IN FULL 748 (2007) (“In this period 
of no obligatory disclosure of political contributions, the Republicans received astounding sums—over 
$20 million, as it turned out—and the only record of the large donors was kept by the faithful and 
vigilant Rose Mary Woods.  The list was known around Washington  as  ‘Rose  Mary’s  Baby.’”). 
 158 H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1998) (arguing that the Watergate scandal sparked an SEC investigation which 
ultimately led Congress to enact the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
 159 See Nixon Dep. (first part), supra note 79, at 25–26. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 69. 
 162 Id. at 40. 
 163 LUKAS, supra note 42, at 127; see also SEC REPORT ON ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS, 
supra note 136, at 36–39 (same). 
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Furthermore, the corporate political spending was not just bipartisan; 
it was also international.164  In the aftermath of Watergate, federal 
investigations revealed that hundreds of American corporations had made 
questionable or illegal payments both domestically and to foreign 
governments—including campaign contributions.165 
II.  REFORMS INSPIRED BY WATERGATE 
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act166 
Stanley Sporkin, then Director of SEC Enforcement, was curious 
about how corporate payments from publicly traded corporations, revealed 
during the Watergate investigations, could make their way into a 
presidential campaign when such donations were patently illegal.167  He 
remarked, “What sparked my interest was the fact that these were cash 
payments to the Committee to Reelect the President which came directly 
out of the corporate treasuries. And I knew that was illegal.”168  Mr. 
Sporkin continued:  
How does Gulf Oil record a transaction of a $50,000 cash payment?  I wanted to 
know, what account did they charge?  Do they have an account called “Bribery”?  
And so I decided to ask one of my investigators to go out and find out how they 
did it . . . .  When we looked into these funds, we found out they were not only 
being used domestically in the United States for illegal campaign contributions, 
but we found that the same monies were being used to bribe officials overseas in 
connection with the companies’ business.169 
Such overseas bribery was not illegal under the U.S. law at the time of the 
1972 election. 
The press reports of American companies giving money to foreign 
officials had enormous impacts abroad.  As Laura E. Longobardi reported:  
 
 164 ALEXANDER, supra note 97, at 20 (reporting on U.S. corporations’ international political 
spending as revealed by the Watergate investigation and noting that “millions   of   [corporate]   dollars  
[were] known  to  have  been  given  to  politicians  in  Italy,  Korea  and  other  countries”). 
 165 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 27, at 405. 
 166 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977); see also S. 
REP. NO. 95-114 at 1, 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098. 
 167 See FRONTLINE, supra note 145; SEC REPORT ON ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS, supra note 
136, at 2 (“In  1973,  as  a  result  of  the  work  of  the  Office  of  the  Special  Prosecutor,  several  corporations  
and executives officers were charged with using corporate funds for illegal domestic political 
contributions.  The Commission recognized that these activities involved matters of possible 
significance to public investors, the nondisclosure of which might entail violations of the federal 
securities laws. . . .  The   Commission’s   inquiry   into   the   circumstances   surrounding   alleged   illegal  
political campaign contributions revealed that violations of the federal securities laws had indeed 
occurred.”). 
 168 See FRONTLINE, supra note 145; Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89,   92   (2010)   (“Although   the   focus   of   the 
Watergate hearings was the attempted burglary of the DNC headquarters, what former SEC 
enforcement chief Stanley Sporkin found most interesting were illegal contributions to the Nixon 
reelection campaign made by corporate executives.”). 
 169 FRONTLINE, supra note 145. 
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The discovery of payments by Lockheed to the Prime Minister of Japan, for 
example, forced his resignation and chilled relations between the two countries.  
Reports that Lockheed had paid Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands $1 million 
compelled him to relinquish his official functions.  Finally, reputed payments by 
Lockheed, Exxon, Mobil, Gulf and other corporations to the Italian Government 
caused the Italian President to resign and strained United States relations with 
Italy, the surrounding Mediterranean area and the entire North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) alliance.170 
In other words, President Nixon was not the only head of state to resign in 
the wake of Watergate.  Rather, the impact was felt in capitols across the 
globe. 
The revelations of corporate political slush funds resulted in the SEC’s 
requiring voluntary disclosure by public corporations of questionable 
foreign and domestic political payments.171  One aspect of the questionable 
payments that most disturbed the SEC was the obfuscation involved.  As 
the SEC reported to Congress in 1976: “The almost universal characteristic 
of the cases  . . . has been the apparent frustration of our system of 
corporate accountability which . . . [requires] not omit[ing] or 
misrepresent[ing] material facts.  Millions of dollars . . . have been 
inaccurately recorded in corporate books and records to facilitate the 
making of questionable payments.”172  The SEC explained to Congress the 
depth of the deception by publicly traded companies included 
“falsifications of corporate financial records, designed to disguise or 
conceal the source and application of corporate funds misused for illegal 
purposes, as well as the existence of secret ‘slush funds’ disbursed outside 
the normal financial accountability system.”173  Not surprisingly, central 
among the legislative fixes to this problem was a strict requirement to keep 
accurate books and records.174 
The scope of the questionable and illegal payments was quite vast, 
occurring not just among a few bad apples, but rather in hundreds of top 
American firms.175  The Senate Report on this investigation noted:  
 
 170 Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What is to Be Done with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 433 (1987) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Bixby, supra note 168,  at  93  (“These  revelations  caused  the  resignation  of  many  important  officials  in  
Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, and other countries, as well as considerable public outcry in the United 
States.”);;  Mark Levin, Lighting Up the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Case Study of U.S. Tobacco 
Industry Political Influence Buying in Japan, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 471, 473 (2009) (stating 
that Congress enacted the far-reaching Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the midst of political reforms 
that emerged from the Watergate scandal). 
 171 SEC REPORT ON ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS, supra note 136, at 3–5 (describing the 
SEC’s  voluntary disclosure program). 
 172 Id. at 2. 
 173 Id. 
 174 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2010). 
 175 SEC REPORT ON ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS, supra note 136, at 16–35 (listing firms 
involved). 
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Recent investigations by the SEC have revealed corrupt foreign payments by 
over 300 U.S. companies involving hundreds of millions of dollars.  These 
revelations have had severe adverse effects.  Foreign governments friendly to the 
United States in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands have come under intense 
pressure from their own people.  The image of American democracy abroad has 
been tarnished.  Confidence in the financial integrity of our corporations has 
been impaired.  The efficient functioning of our capital markets has been 
hampered.176 
Or as the Department of Justice put it, post-Watergate investigations by the 
SEC revealed: “The abuses ran the gamut from bribery of high foreign 
officials to secure some type of favorable action by a foreign government 
to so-called facilitating payments that allegedly were made to ensure that 
government functionaries discharged certain ministerial or clerical 
duties.”177 The GAO reported that, in total, 450 companies admitted 
making $300 million in questionable or illegal payments.178  These SEC 
investigations prompted the Congress to pass the FCPA.179 
The major purpose of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(FCPA) was to prevent corporate bribery of foreign officials that came to 
light in post-Watergate investigations.180  Thus, the FCPA is one of many 
reforms inspired by Watergate.181 
The FCPA amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require 
registered issuers to keep detailed books, records, and accounts that 
accurately record corporate payments and transactions.182  The FCPA also 
requires SEC registered issuers to institute and maintain an internal 
 
 176 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3. 
 177 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (undated), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf. 
 178 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. 
BUSINESS: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 1 (1981). 
 179 Claudius O. Sokenu, FCPA & Global Anti-Corruption Insights: An Update on Recent Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act And Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement, Litigation, And Compliance, 1949 
PLI/CORP 225,  231  (Winter  2012)  (“In  the  maelstrom  of  outrage  that  followed  the  Watergate scandal, 
and  in  response  to  the  SEC’s  extensive  investigation  into  questionable  (or  illegal)  payments  by  United  
States corporations to foreign government officials, politicians, and/or political parties, Congress 
enacted the FCPA . . . .”). 
 180 Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 7,  at  25  (“In 1977, the United States Congress passed the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (‘FCPA’) following a series of corruption scandals highlighted by the 
Watergate investigation and the resulting resignation of President Richard Nixon.  While Watergate 
itself highlighted political corruption, the investigation shed a corresponding light on corporate 
corruption and bribery.”);;   MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41466, FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (FCPA): CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST AND EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT 1 
(2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41466.pdf. 
 181 Kevin E. Davi, Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism, Self-Interest, 
Or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497,  498   (2012)   (“A  mix  of  moralism  and  self-interest 
motivated the initial enactment of the FCPA.  The FCPA was passed in direct response to evidence 
uncovered  in  the  course  of  investigations  sparked  by  the  Watergate  scandal.”);;  Gary  M. Elden & Mark 
S. Sableman, Negligence Is Not Corruption: The Scienter Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819,  819   (1980)   (noting   that   “[i]n   response   to  Watergate   era  
revelations that United States businesses were engaging in bribery abroad, Congress enacted the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977”). 
 182 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2010). 
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accounting control system.183  Thirdly, the FCPA prohibits domestic 
corporations, whether or not registered with the SEC, from bribing a 
foreign official, a foreign political party, party official, or candidate for the 
purpose of obtaining or maintaining business.184 
The FCPA applies to political contributions abroad if they are made 
with corrupt motives.185  The SEC has brought a few cases under the statute 
for foreign political contributions.186  In one case, Schering-Plough gave 
$76,000 to a charity headed by a Polish official that purchased health 
materials for Polish hospitals.187  In another case, Titan paid $3.5 million to 
an agent in Benin who funneled the money to the election of Benin’s 
incumbent president.188 
Congress also enacted the FCPA to restore public confidence in the 
integrity of the American capital markets.189  In a speech supporting the 
passage of the FCPA, then-SEC Commissioner John R. Evans argued for 
the need for transparency and highlighted the risk posed to the soundness 
of the financial markets by these foreign bribes: “[These overseas 
payments] . . . raise questions regarding the quality and integrity of 
professional corporate managers and whether they are fulfilling their 
obligations to their boards of directors, shareholders, and the general 
public.”190   
For decades the FCPA lay fallow—rarely enforced.191  But the statute 
has enjoyed a post-9/11 renaissance.192  Nearly thirty-five years later, the 
FCPA serves as a powerful anti-corruption tool outside of the United 
States.193  The U.S. was the first country, via the FCPA, to criminalize the 
 
 183 SEITZINGER, supra note 180, at 1; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2010). 
 184 SEITZINGER, supra note 180, at 1; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2010). 
 185 ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK, A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR 
CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS 146 (2d ed.  2012). 
 186 Id. at 148–49. 
 187 Id. at 148 (explaining In Re Schering Plough). 
 188 Id. at 149 (explaining United States v. Titan). 
 189 Statement on Signing S. 305 Into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977) (statement by 
President   Jimmy   Carter)   (“Corrupt   practices   between   corporations   and   public   officials overseas 
undermine the integrity and stability of governments . . . .”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 7 (1977), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf (“The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of 
foreign officials . . . is unethical. . . . But not only is it unethical, it is bad business as well . . . .  In short, 
it rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their 
standards or risk losing business.”). 
 190 John R. Evans, Of Boycotts and Bribery, and Corporate Accountability, SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N NEWS 9 (Oct. 5, 1976), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
1976/100576evans.pdf.  
 191 Ashcroft &  Ratcliffe, supra note 7,   at   26   (“Despite   its   noble   intent,   over   the   first   several  
decades of its existence the FCPA remained a largely unenforced and nearly dormant piece of 
legislation.”). 
 192 Id.   (“Senior officials for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) . . . have gone so far as to 
declare  the  FCPA  to  be  second  only  to  the  prevention  of  terrorism  as  an  agency  priority.”). 
 193 See T. Markus Funk & M. Bridget Minder, Bribery of Foreign Officials [FCPA], BLOOMBERG 
LAW REPORTS: CORPORATE AND M&A LAW 1 (Dec. 29, 2011), available at 
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practice of bribing foreign officials, and was alone in doing so for two 
decades.194  In 1997, the FCPA was expanded to cover extra-territorial 
jurisdiction over U.S. companies and U.S. nationals in non-U.S. 
companies.195  At the same time, the Organization for Economic and 
Cooperative Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions was signed in 
1997.196  This convention has thirty-four signatories, including the U.S., 
and is meant to criminalize bribery among many of America’s trading 
partners.197 
The FCPA is enforced jointly by the SEC and DOJ.198  FCPA 
penalties have increased in severity over time, as the SEC and DOJ have 
sought not just penalties and fines, but also disgorgement of profits and jail 
time.199  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) builds on this foundation by containing a 
whistleblower bounty provision that allows informants to possibly recover 
up to 30% of FCPA judgments in excess of $1 million.200  In the past 
decade, the number of FCPA enforcement cases has been trending 
higher.201  Today, the FCPA is enforced with full weight of the law and on 
a regular basis with fines as high as $800 million.202  
B. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 
After Watergate, the American public clamored for changes to the 
way money in politics was regulated.203  As I have already alluded to, the 
 
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/LIT_12_01funkminderfcpayear-in-review.pdf   (“2011—like 
2010—witnessed boundary-pushing FCPA enforcement actions, with more FCPA trials than in any 
prior year and the longest prison sentence (15 years) ever imposed under  the  FCPA.”); see also Peter 
Dreier & Donald Cohen, Wal-Mart’s  Honest  Graft, DISSENT MAG., June 21, 2012 (contrasting FCPA 
and domestic election law). 
 194 ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2 (2010); 
but see Susan Rose-Ackerman &  Sin-Ad Hunt, Transparency and Business Advantage: The Impact of 
International Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States National Interest, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 433 (2012)  (refuting  the  U.S.  Chamber’s  arguments  in  favor  of  weakening  the  FCPA). 
 195 Danforth Newcomb & Philip Urosky, Eyes on Your Bribe, THE EUROPEAN LAWYER, Dec. 
2007/Jan. 2008, at 48. 
 196 TARUN, supra note 185, at 55. 
 197 Id. at 55–56. 
 198 Id. at 248–49 (DOJ and SEC conduct parallel investigations). 
 199 Id.   at   248   (“mega   settlements  of   $100  million  or  more  will   continue”);;  Sherman  &  Sterling  
LLP, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement (Feb. 13, 2008), in NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education 2008). 
 200 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 922–
924, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–50 (2010). 
 201 Dionne Searcey, U.S. Cracks Down on Corporate Bribes, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2009, at A1 
(SEC and DOJ conducted 140 FCPA investigations in 2009). 
 202 TARUN, supra note 185, at 248 (the ten top FCPA fines from 2008–2011 ranged from $70 
million to $800 million). 
 203 Hasen, supra note 17, at 352 (quoting ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND THE 
COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW (1988)  (“[W]ell  over  25  percent  of  all  
mail [sent to members of Congress] in the post-Watergate period [was] . . . on campaign finance, far 
more  than  on  any  other  issue.”). 
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was only one of the reforms to come out of 
Watergate.  The scandal also inspired campaign finance reformers as 
well.204  The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA 74) was that 
signature reform.205  As the Senate Select Committee explained, “[Our] 
major legislative recommendations relate to the creation of new institutions 
necessary to safeguard the electoral process . . . the committee is hopeful 
that, despite the excesses of Watergate, the Nation will return to its 
democratic ideals established almost 200 years ago.”206  The concrete 
legislative suggestions by the Senate Select Committee included:  
Draft a code of candidate responsibility, with appropriate disciplinary rules and 
grievance procedures, to be enforced through a Federal Elections 
Commission . . . . Require Federal candidates and officeholders to fully disclose 
all sources of income and assets or liabilities over $1,500 . . . for publication in 
the Congressional Record . . . . Prohibit candidates for Federal elective office 
from accepting cash contributions over $50 or spending more than $10,000 in 
personal funds.207  
The final version of FECA 74 contained many of these basic elements, 
though the details, like the dollar thresholds, changed during the legislative 
drafting process.208  At the urging of advocates, the new law contained 
public financing, which was not among the original suggestions by the 
Senate Select Committee. FECA 74 included “hard money” $1,000 
contribution209 and expenditure limits,210 improved disclosure,211 the 
formation of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the Presidential 
Public Financing System.212  FECA 74 was challenged in the landmark 
Supreme Court case of Buckley v. Valeo.213  Referring to FECA 74, the 
Buckley lower court wrote, “Congress knew there were no absolute 
guarantees that its reforms . . . would achieve the objective of curbing the 
excesses of campaign financing permeated by contributions of monied and 
 
 204 Thomas E. Mann, The Rise of Soft Money, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE, at 18 
(“The  fund-raising scandals associated with Watergate and the committee to reelect President Richard 
Nixon—featuring attaché cases stuffed with thousands of dollars, illegal corporate contributions, and 
conduits to hide the original source of contributions—led Congress to return to the campaign finance 
drawing board.  In 1974 they produced major amendments to FECA, which constituted the most serious 
and ambitious effort ever to regulate the flow of money  in  federal  elections.”). 
 205 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13,   at   xxiii   (“The   committee’s   enabling   resolution . . 
. instructs the committee . . . to determine whether  new  legislation  is  needed  ‘to  safeguard  the  electoral  
process  by  which  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  chosen.’”). 
 206 Id. at xxv. 
 207 Id. at 1229. 
 208 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 
1263, 1266 (1974). 
 209 Id. § 101, 88 Stat. 1263. 
 210 Id. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1265. 
 211 Id. § 201, 88 Stat. at 1272–75. 
 212 Id. § 208, 88 Stat. at 1279–81. 
 213 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 62,  at  396  (“The  [Buckley] case presented more than 
twenty constitutional questions.”). 
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special interests.  But Congress knew, too, that the perfect can be the 
enemy of the good . . . .”214 
When Buckley reached the Supreme Court, the review of the law 
turned into an exercise in judicial line editing of the FECA 74 statute.  
Consequently, what was left after the Supreme Court’s handiwork was a 
law that no one in Congress had voted for, nor what President Ford 
signed.215  Buckley was a “split the baby” decision worthy of King 
Solomon.216  The decision not only diced the statute; it also splintered the 
Court.217 
The Buckley Supreme Court upheld voluntary public financing,218 the 
FEC219 and FECA’s disclosure requirements.220  The Court decided that 
contributions could be constitutionally limited, but independent 
expenditures could not.221  The Court found under the magic words test that 
express advocacy could be regulated, but nearly identical sham issue ads 
could not.222  Similarly, the Court ruled under the major purpose test that 
political action committees (PACs) could be regulated, but very similar 
political organizations could not.223  Within the Buckley structure are many 
of the loopholes which allow many of the same practices that FECA 74 was 
meant to prevent,224 like soft money to political parties,225 sham issue 
 
 214 Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 215 Kenneth J. Levit, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v. Valeo, 103 YALE 
L.J. 469, 473 (1993) (stating that the Court essentially rewrote the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act 
by ruling selectively on several of its components); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 873, 884 (1987) (stating that although  the  state’s  main  purpose  was  to  equalize  the  relative  ability  
of individuals and groups to influence the outcomes of elections with the 1974 Federal Election 
Campaign Act, the Court found this justification to be constitutionally illegitimate). 
 216 Hasen, supra note 17, at 346 (“The   Supreme  Court   too  was   divided   on   the   law’s   [FECA’s]  
constitutionality, and it produced a Solomonic unsigned opinion that left both sides in the litigation 
partly  unsatisfied.”). 
 217 SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010) (Brennan 
proposed a single opinion signed by all nine  justices.    Instead  “[t]he  end  result  was  an  unsigned  opinion  
for the Court . . . [and] five separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part . . . .”). 
 218 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85–86, 143 (1976). 
 219 Id. at 109–43. 
 220 Id. at 65–67, 143. 
 221 Id. at 26–27 (contribution limits); id. at 46–47 (expenditures); see also Monica Youn, First 
Amendment Fault Lines and the Citizens United Decision, in MONEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 98   (2011)   (“[T]he contribution/expenditure distinction has survived less as settled 
doctrine than as détente: the demarcation line where both sides lay down their arms out of exhaustion, 
rather than as a result  of  negotiated  surrender.”). 
 222 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
 223 Id. at 79–80. 
 224 Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and 
Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 55 (1987) (arguing that despite the existence of a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme, few, if any, congressional goals were actually met due to the 
decision rendered in Buckley); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Introduction, in IF BUCKLEY FELL, A FIRST 
AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 3 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed. 1999) 
(“The  Court’s  distinction  between  contributions  and  spending  means  the  government  cannot limit how 
much of the family fortune a Steve Forbes can sink in his own campaign.  It means no end to the money 
chase that consumes candidates.  And it means no lid on the funds a nominally independent player, like 
the AFL-CIO or a wealthy benefactor, may spend on television ads promoting a candidate.”). 
 225 Soft money was the money collected by political parties between 1976–2002 that was not 
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ads,226 and the use of nonprofits to mask the true sources of money in 
politics.227  In contrast to the FCPA, which is still in force and has been 
expanded overtime, FECA 74 never got off the drawing board.  Or as one 
author put it, “the Supreme Court dismantled FECA [74] before it took 
effect . . . .”228  Thus, the impact of these two post-Watergate reforms 
appears to have more saliency abroad than at home.229 
III.  WATERGATE’S LESSONS FOR TODAY 
So what lessons does the Watergate experience have for the present 
day, especially in the post-Citizens United world, and what are some of the 
problems that persist despite the sweeping legislation that was passed to 
address Watergate?230 
The problem of money in politics is as real now in 2012 as it was in 
1972.  On one hand, in 2012 a single individual cannot currently write a 
$100,000 check to a presidential campaign.231  Thanks to post-Watergate 
reforms, individuals have a hard money limit of $2,500 which democratizes 
how presidential campaigns are run.232  The fact that presidential candidates 
now rely on millions of small donors in order to run a campaign is no 
accident.233 
 
subject  to  FECA’s  hard  money  contribution  limits.     Soft  money  became illegal under BCRA in 2002. 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n,   540   U.S.   93,   133   (2003)   (explaining   BCRA   “takes   national  
parties out of the soft-money business.”).  The  soft  money  ban  is  still  in  effect.  Republican  Nat.  Comm.  
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 09-1287, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010) (summarily affirming lower court ruling 
upholding the soft money ban for political parties). 
 226 McConnell closed  the  sham  issue  ad  loophole  by  making  it  clear  “that  the  distinction  between  
express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitutionally  compelled.” McConnell, 540 U.S. 
at 105. 
 227 THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CITIZENS UNITED AND THE 2010 
MIDTERM ELECTIONS (Dec. 2010), available at http://advocate.nyc.gov/files/12-06-
10CitizensUnitedReport.pdf (discussing undisclosed spending in the 2010 midterm election). 
 228 Frank J. Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 13 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed. 1999). 
 229 I am not the first to compare the strength of the FCPA to the weakness of domestic federal 
election laws. See Trevor Potter, Pity the Watchdog in a Lion’s Den, WALL ST. J., Aug 2, 1994, at A14. 
(“To   much   of   the   country,   these   [corporate   PAC]   contributions   look   like   attempted   bribery,   or   a  
protection racket.  In all likelihood, such contributions would violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
if  engaged  in  by  a  U.S.  company  anywhere  else  in  the  world.”). 
 230 To be fair, many have argued that long before Citizens United, corporate political power was 
already vast. See, e.g., HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 106, at 293   (“[T]he Citizens United majority 
was kicking on an open door.  As our tour of winner-take-all politics has demonstrated, those with the 
greatest economic resources already have ample opportunity to deploy their formidable advantages in 
politics.”). 
 231 Contributions, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, (Feb. 2011), http://www.fec.gov/ 
pages/brochures/contrib.shtml#Chart (listing $2,500/person/election limit). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Michael J. Malbin, Small Donors, Large Donors and the Internet: Rethinking Public Financing 
for Presidential Elections after Obama, in PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 36, 49 (Costas 
Panagopoulos ed., 2011)  (“The total amount he received over the primary season in amounts of $200 or 
less ($212 million) nearly equaled what Clinton or McCain received from all sources combined.  
Almost three-quarters of the financial advantage Obama ultimately held over Clinton can be explained 
by  his  advantage  in  small  contributions.”). 
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On the other hand, as explained above, Buckley resulted in “the system 
we have today: unlimited spending, with candidates forced to raise the 
sums in relatively small discrete amounts, and to compete in a campaign 
arms race, all the while worried that a bored millionaire will decide to ‘self-
finance’ . . . .”234  The litigation that followed Buckley only made matters 
worse.  Key campaign finance protections have eroded in the past forty 
years because of the Supreme Court.235  Congress raised federal 
contribution limits from $1,000 to $2,000 in 2002 and indexed them for 
inflation so that they grow larger and larger over time.236 Because of lax 
regulation at the FEC, post-Watergate disclosures can be evaded by the use 
of intermediaries.237  And the FEC is typically deadlocked on key 
enforcement decisions and rulemakings.238  In contrast to the hundred 
million dollar fines which give the FCPA teeth, FECA’s largest fine was a 
$3.8 million civil penalty.239  Finally, as a sad testament to the deterioration 
of a once noble reform, only one presidential candidate made use of the 
Presidential Public Financing System in the 2012 election.240 
In 2012, corporate money may play a more deleterious role in 
elections because the modern Supreme Court has left fewer campaign 
finance regulations intact for corporations than existed in 1972.241  In 
 
 234 MICHAEL WALDMAN, A RETURN TO COMMON SENSE 69 (2008). 
 235 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right   to   Life,   551   U.S.   449,   481   (2007)   (“WRTL II”)  
(invalidating the federal source restriction for ads which were not the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008) (invalidating the federal 
Millionaires Amendment); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) 
(invalidating federal corporate political expenditure bans). 
 236 The FEC has a chart with current contribution limits, which may be viewed at 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml. 
 237 Bruce F. Freed & Jamie Carroll, Hidden Rivers: How Trade Associations Conceal Corporate 
Political Spending, Its Threat To Companies, And What Shareholders Can Do, CTR. FOR POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY, 1–2 (Jan. 1, 2006), available at http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht 
=a/GetDocumentAction/i/932; CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS 
UNITED (2011). This lack of transparency at the FEC could come to an end soon. See Van Hollen v. 
FEC, 1:11-cv-00766-ABJ, slip op. (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012) (finding the FEC acted beyond its authority 
when it narrowed electioneering communications disclosures), aff’d, No. 12-5117 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 
2012).  
 238 R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40779, DEADLOCKED VOTES AMONG MEMBERS 
OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC): OVERVIEW AND POTENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
CONGRESS, 5 (2009), available at  http://www.hvjlaw.com/ 
upload_files/CRS_FEC_Deadlocks.pdf; Marian Wang, FEC Deadlocks (Again) on Guidance for Big-
Money Super PACs, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 2, 2011, 1:21 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/deadlocks-again-on-guidance-for-big-money-super-pacs; Kathleen 
Ronayne, Federal Election Commission Deadlocks in Discussions About New Disclosure Rules for 
Political Advertisements, OPEN SECRETS BLOG (June 16, 2011, 3:26 PM), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/06/federal-election-commission-deadlocks.html. 
 239 See TARUN supra note 185 (listing FCPA penalties up to $800 million), but compare with 
Press Release, Federal Election Commission, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie 
Mac”) Pays Largest Fine in FEC History (Apr. 18, 2006), 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2006/20060418mur.html (listing $3.8 million FEC fine). 
 240 Catalina Camia, Roemer Qualifies for Federal Matching Funds, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2012, 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2012/02/buddy-roemer-matching-funds-
federal-election-commission-/1. 
 241 Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (invalidating federal corporate political expenditure 
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Nixon’s time, under the Taft Hartley Act, it was not legal for American 
Airlines to run ads supporting his candidacy, but now such expenditures are 
perfectly legal.242 
Citizens United allows corporations to spend treasury funds on two 
types of political advertisements.  The first is independent expenditures—
these are the ads that use Buckley v. Valeo’s magic words such as “vote for 
or vote against,” or “support or oppose.”243  The other type of ads that 
Citizens United allows is electioneering communications or what some call 
“sham issue ads.”  These are ads that purport to discuss an issue and have a 
candidate in them.  The whole point of this type of sham issue ads was to 
avoid the federal corporate independent expenditures ban.  Because of 
McCain-Feingold, these sham issue ads were regulated from 2002–2010.244  
But post-Citizens United, we are now back to where the law was in 1907 
(pre-Taft Hartley).  Because the Tillman Act is still in effect, corporations 
cannot give directly to a federal candidate,245 but they can spend unlimited 
funds independently in support of or against candidates.  So in other words, 
they cannot give $2,500 directly to a candidate for President, but they could 
under Citizens United potentially buy Super Bowl ads supporting (or 
opposing) a candidate. 246 
Congress responded to the problem of Watergate’s quid pro quo 
corruption with both changes to the election law in FECA 74 and through 
the securities laws in the FCPA in 1977.  Now, post-Citizens United, I 
would argue that both campaign finance responses and securities law 
responses are required.247 
A. Corporate Law Reforms 
Following the money in politics, as Mark Felt suggested to Woodward 
and Bernstein, remains a challenge.248  Forty years later, one issue that has 
persisted long after Watergate is the need for better disclosure of the 
sources of campaign financing so that the public can keep an eye on who is 
 
bans). 
 242 Amendment to the National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80–101, 61 Stat. 159 (1947). 
 243 Independent   expenditures   contain   “magic   words   of   express   advocacy,”  which   come   from   a  
1976 Supreme Court case, Buckley v. Valeo’s  footnote  52,  which  listed  examples  of  words  that  would  
render an ad subject to regulation under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The Buckley list 
includes:   “vote   for,”   “elect,”   “support,”   “cast   your  ballot   for,”   “Smith   for  Congress,”   “vote   against,”  
“defeat,”  and  “reject.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52. 
 244 Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and 
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251, 254 (2004); see generally ROBERT 
F. BAUER, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (2004) (explaining the multiple ways McCain-Feingold 
changed existing federal election law). 
 245 Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 420 Stat. 864 (1907). 
 246 Sam Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 131 (2011). 
 247 See generally Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending, supra note 27; Torres-Spelliscy, 
Corporate Campaign Spending, supra note 27. 
 248 Ex-FBI Official: I’m  ‘Deep  Throat’, supra note 29. 
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seeking to influence politics through money.249  In today’s post-Citizens 
United world, we have a growing problem of undisclosed corporate and 
union money because of pre-existing disclosure loopholes.250  The problem 
is black box spending, which is not a new one, but is only likely to grow 
after Citizens United.251  The black boxes are political nonprofits such as 
social welfare organizations (501(c)(4)s) and trade associations or business 
leagues (501(c)(6)s).252  If corporate spending is funneled through one of 
these groups, then voters and shareholders alike are left in the dark about 
where the money is coming from in federal elections.253  In short, if a 
political donor wishes to remain anonymous, they just need to go through 
an opaque intermediary like a trade association or 501(c)(4).254  One of the 
ways to solve this problem is establishing stronger post-Citizens United 
SEC rules.  There is a petition pending before the SEC right now255 
requesting a new SEC rule which would require transparency for political 
spending by publicly traded corporations.256  As of the time of this writing, 
the SEC had received over 285,000 public comments in support of a new 
transparency rule.257 
 
 249 See SABATO & SIMPSON supra note  1,  at  152  (“Corrupt  practices  flourish  in   the  shadows.”);;  
Torres-Spelliscy, Transparent Elections, supra note 237 at 6–7. 
 250 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-
Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 26 NEXUS: 
CHAP. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1833484. 
 251 The average publicly-traded corporation has not agreed to voluntarily disclose its political 
spending. See Paul Denicola, Bruce F. Freed, Stephan C. Passantino, & Karl J. Sandstrom, Handbook 
On Corporate Political Activity: Emerging Corporate Governance Issues, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, 
(2010), at 6 available at 
http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/id/4084 (noting that 
disclosure by for-profit corporations is still not  the  norm  finding  “as  of  October  2010,  seventy-six major 
American corporations, including half of the S&P 100, had adopted codes of political disclosure.  
However, a similar shift toward political disclosure has not yet taken place outside of the S&P 100”);;  
Heidi Welsh & Robin Young, Corporate Governance of Political Expenditures: 2011 Benchmark 
Report on S&P 500 Companies, SUSTAINABLE INV. INSTITUTE 8 (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Political_Spending_Report_Nov_10_2011.pdf   (“106 [of the S&P 500] 
do not appear to spend, 99 companies in the index both spend and report (in some fashion) and 278 
companies spend and do not report on it (two-thirds  of  the  spenders).”). 
 252 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4), (c)(6) (2006). 
 253 According to the instructions  for  FEC  Form  9,  “[i]f  you  are  a  corporation,  labor  organization  or  
Qualified Nonprofit Corporation making communications permissible under [11 C.F.R.] 114.15 and 
you received no donations made specifically for the purpose of funding electioneering communications, 
enter  ‘0’  (zero).”  Instructions for Preparing FEC Form 9, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (undated), available 
at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm9i.pdf; see also FEC FORM 5 REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
EXPENDITURES MADE AND CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (2009), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm5.pdf. 
 254 Freed & Carroll, supra note 237, at 1–2.  
 255 See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Shining a Light on Expenditures of Shareholder Money, 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://electionlawblog.org/wp-
content/uploads/aguilar.pdf. 
 256 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Comment Submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Endorsing a New Rule on Transparency of Corporate Political Spending (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1955950. 
 257 Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Petition to Require 
Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources for Political Activities 
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Another parallel between then and now is the corporate governance 
problem caused when corporate managers spend corporate funds on 
politics.258  What these managers are spending is what Justice Brandeis 
once termed, “other people’s money.”259  As Columbia Professor John 
Coffee once put it, when it comes to corporate political spending, 
“managerial and shareholder interests are not well aligned.”260  So then, as 
now, there is the problem of shareholders unwittingly underwriting 
political spending without a consent mechanism.261  During Watergate, the 
$100,000 in illegal contributions was the issue; today, the potential for 
unlimited legal corporate political expenditures should worry investors.262 
The U.K. has already tackled the corporate governance problem 
created by corporate political spending.263  They changed their law a dozen 
years ago to require a shareholder vote before a public company could 
spend in politics.264  This model from the U.K. Companies Act should be 
adopted here to protect investors from modern corporate political spending.  
This could be accomplished by passage of the Shareholder Protection Act, 
which has been introduced in both Houses of Congress.265 
 
[File No. 4-637], http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4-637.shtml (last visited May 9, 2012). 
 258 Comment of Dr. Susan Holmberg, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Corporate Political Spending 
Disclosure, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 4 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
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(Aggarwal  et  al.  2011).”). 
 259 LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY & HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914). 
 260 John C. Coffee, Jr., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial Services, United States House of 
Representatives, 1 (Mar. 11, 2010) available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/coffee.pdf. 
 261 See Michael Hadani, Institutional Ownership Monitoring and Corporate Political Activity: 
Governance Implications, 65 J. BUS. RES. 944 (2011); John Coates, Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth?, 1 
(Harvard Center for Law, Econ. & Bus.,  Discussion Paper No. 684, Sept. 21, 2010),  available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680861; Remarks of John Coates, Can Shareholders Save Democracy, 
Accountability After Citizens United Symposium (Apr. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/accountability_after_citizens_united; Rajesh Aggarwal, 
Felix Meschke & Tracy Wang, Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency? 2 (Working 
Paper, June 25, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670. 
 262 Elizabeth Kennedy, Protecting Shareholders after Citizens United (Brennan Center 2011) 
(noting   that   “[n]ow   .   .   .   there   are   no   rules   to   prevent   a   manager from breaking out the corporate 
checkbook and doling out thousands of company dollars to support the candidate of his choice.  And, 
there  are  no  requirements  that  a  company  tell  its  shareholders  when  this  happens.”). 
 263 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Kathy Fogel, Shareholder-Authorized Corporate Political Spending 
in the United Kingdom, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 479, 497–502 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1853706. 
 264 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, §§ 139–140, & sch. 19 (2000) 
(Eng.). 
 265 H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
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B. Campaign Finance Reforms 
Thoughtful money-in-politics reforms, like accurate disclosure and 
public financing, are also needed to compliment securities law reforms 
because the issue of corruption has not gone away.  The risk that those in 
power will shake down those with financial wealth remains a live issue.266  
During the McConnell litigation before the Supreme Court, an ex-CEO 
declared under oath: 
When sitting Members solicit large corporate and union contributions, the 
leaders of these organizations feel intense pressure to contribute, because 
experience has taught that the consequences of failing to contribute or failing to 
contribute enough may be very negative.  Business and labor leaders believe 
based on their experience, that disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, 
may shun or disfavor them because they have not contributed.267 
This insider account should give us great pause about what may be going 
on behind closed doors.268  This sounds eerily similar to the way Mr. Spater 
framed the issue of corporate political spending before the Senate 
Watergate investigators in the 1970s. 
Pending campaign finance legislation in Congress could go a long 
way in revitalizing the way our elections are run.  In the House, Rep. Chris 
Van Hollen has introduced the DISCLOSE Act, which would provide 
transparency to the source of money in federal elections.269  Meanwhile, 
Senator Durbin has introduced the Fair Elections Now Act in the Senate.270  
Fair Elections would give candidates for Congress an incentive to focus on 
small dollar donors by matching low contributions with federal dollars.271  
Combined, these reforms could provide candidates with an alternative to 
the current system which increasingly relies on secretive private money. 
 
 266 McConnell   v.   Fed.   Election   Comm’n,   540   U.S.   93,   125   n.13   (2003)   (“[V]arious   business 
leaders attest that corporate soft-money   contributions   are   ‘coerced’ . . . and   that   ‘[b]usiness   leaders  
increasingly wish to be freed from the grip of a system in which they fear the adverse consequences of 
refusing to fill the coffers of the major parties.’”). 
 267 Declaration of Gerald Greenwald at 3–4, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 
(2003) (No. 02-0582), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/ 
attachments/BCRA_MCCAIN_FEINGOLD/McConnell_v_FEC_District_Court/708.pdf. Mr. 
Greenwald was the Chairman of United Airlines. Id. at 1. 
 268 Far too often, what goes on behind closed doors is not just unethical; it is illegal. See 
CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT iii (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/corporate-fraud2008.pdf (federal task force reporting to 
President  George  W.  Bush,   “[From] July 2002 [through April 2008], the Department of Justice has 
obtained nearly 1,300 corporate fraud convictions.  These figures include convictions of more than 200 
chief executive officers and corporate presidents, more than 120 corporate vice presidents, and more 
than 50 chief financial officers.”). 
 269 H. R. 4010, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr4010ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr4010ih.pdf (providing for greater transparency of political spending in 
federal elections). 
 270 S. 750, 112th. Cong. (2011), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=112_cong_bills&docid=f:s750is.txt.pdf (providing for public financing in 
Congressional elections). 
 271 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The scope of what went wrong in Nixon’s White House is difficult to 
comprehend forty years after the fact.272  Twisting the executive branch to 
the will of the reelection effort meant violations of the separation of 
powers, the rule of law, and the integrity of party politics.  As Senator 
Weicker noted in the Senate Select Report, ultimately “dirty tricks [ ] were 
aimed at the voter.”273  By 1977, even Nixon appeared to understand the 
depth of what he had done.  He told reporter David Frost, “I let down the 
country, I let down our system of government and the dreams of all those 
young people that ought to get into government, but will think it is all too 
corrupt . . . .”274 
In 2012, with an unprecedented amount of money pumping through 
the first post-Citizens United presidential election,275 America faces the 
scary potential for a second Watergate.  As former Republican Presidential 
candidate Senator John McCain put it recently, “I predict to you there will 
be a major scandal associated with the Supreme Court decision on Citizens 
[ ] United.  There is too much money washing around.”276  Meanwhile, 
former White House Counsel Bob Bauer argued that the whole campaign 
finance system needs modernization.277  I could not agree more. 
We do not live in a Greek myth.  Subsequently, we must craft 
legislative reforms the hard way through the political process.  In the 
1970s, the revelations of Watergate shocked Congress and two Presidents 
out of their complacency to enact strong reforms.  We should not have to 
repeat history’s mistakes before Congress and the President are motivated 
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to tackle the problem of money in politics once more.  Democracy deserves 
to defend itself.  Another Watergate is not inevitable if reasonable policy 
changes, like those suggested here, are put in place. 
 
